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ABSTRACT
The study describes NATO’s enlargement process in the post-Cold War era up 
to the Madrid summit in 1997. The study begins by describing the evolution o f 
enlargement that began with the request o f countries in Central Europe for NATO 
membership. NATO has established NACC, PfP and EAPC that became integral 
components o f enlargement. These components laid down the foundation for 
enlargement. Possible criteria for membership and various alternatives together with 
NATO’s own path to enlargement are presented. The enlargement debate o f NATO 
that include the proponents and opponents are presented in detail for an overall 
understanding o f the advantages and disadvantages o f the enlargement issue. The study 
concludes with a burden-sharing assessment for NATO that includes the costs and 
strategic implications o f enlargement. An overview o f three studies published on the 
financial costs and military implications o f enlargement are presented. Finally, an 
assessment o f the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland followed by an overall 
assessment o f enlargement is made to conclude the study.
Ill
ÖZET
Bu çalışma, NATO'nun Soğuk Savaş dönemi sonrası Doğu Avurpa ülkelerinin 
üyelik talepleriyle başlayan 1997 Madrid zirvesine kadar olan genişleme sürecini 
anlatmaktadır. NATO'un kurmuş olduğu NACC, PfP ve EAPC genişleme politikasınm 
temelini oluşturmuş ve genişleme politikasım belirlemiştir. NATO'mm kendi seçtiği 
genişleme politikası NATO üyeliği için muhtemel kriterler ve değişik genişleme 
alternatifleri ile birlikte sunulmuştur. NATO'nun genişleme tartışmasmda genişlemeyi 
destekleyen ve reddedenlerin iddiaları, genişlemenin avantajları ve dezavantajlan 
ayrmtıh biçimde ortaya konulmuş olup; çahşma, genişlemenin NATO'ya getireceği 
finansal ve stratejik yükümlülükleri değerlendirmektedir. Finansal ve stratejik 
yükümlülükler konusunda yayınlanan üç çalışma kısaca ele alınmıştır. Çalışma Çek 
Cumhuriyeti, Macaristan ve Polonya'nm üyeliklerinin değerlendirilmesinin ardmdan 
genişleme konusunda genel bir izah ile sona ermektedir.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
The fall o f the Berlin Wall and the unification o f Germany marked the end of 
the Cold War, causing a domino wave in the Soviet Union towards disintegration into 
smaller and independent coimtries, The threat for NATO’s raison d’être had 
disappeared but the debate about its future existence was received both with criticisms 
and blessings. Although the ideological conflict between the bipolar world was over, 
threats to peace had increased enormously and appeared in different forms. The only 
mihtary organization in the position o f countering post-Cold War threats was NATO 
again. NATO, created in 1949, was designed to be a collective defense organization 
and its prime goals were to deter any Soviet aggression in Europe and contain the 
spread of communism from spilling over to the geography of the Atlantic Alliance. 
NATO has achieved these goals successfully without resorting to the use o f force. 
With the diminishing o f the Soviet Empire the Atlantic Alliance, for the first time in its 
history, was no longer facing a significant military threat o f any kind.* The security 
challenges and risks that NATO faces in the post-Cold War are different in nature from 
those in the past. In the Alliance’s New Strategic Concept, it was stated that “the risks 
to AQied security [that] remain [are] multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional,” 
thus making Allied security very hard to predict and assess. It is stated that these 
threats may rise from “adverse consequences o f instabilities” due to “serious economic, 
social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which 
are faced by many countries in Central and Eastern Europe.”  ^ According to Meiers, 
“instead o f a direct and visible Soviet military threat, there are now myriads of
destabilizing, dangerous, and in many cases unexpected challenges.” He cites the wars 
in former Yugoslavia as “the most dramatic exanqile in the post-Communist Europe
where the old demons are alive and well.”^
In the Cold War era, NATO's aim was to confront, contain and deter Soviet 
communist expansionism. Therefore, the strategic security environment was clear and 
stable. This stability gave the West the opportunity to identify its security needs and 
plan for its actions. However, with the end of the Cold War, the unifying threat that 
had kept the Alliance together for more than four decades had ceased and thus, left the 
question open whether there were still common objectives and interests for the 
Alliance to keep it unified. The rationale for the concept o f ‘one for all, all for one’ as 
envisaged in Article V* of the Washington Treaty that provided for defense obligations 
is today less relevant then before. Mainly, because the military threat posed by the 
Soviet Union no longer existed.
The drastic change o f the strategic security environment had prompted NATO 
to adapt to the post-Cold War by redefining its fimction to deal with new challenges 
ahead. During the London Summit in July 1990, NATO’s Heads o f State and 
Government agreed on the need to transform the Alliance “to reflect the new, more 
promising, era in Europe.” At the summit, the decision was made to review NATO’s 
role and functions in adapting to the new environment. The results o f the review were 
announced at the Rome Summit on 7-8 November 1991 as the Alliance’s “New 
Strategic Concept.” In order to easier counter the challenges lying ahead, the “New 
Strategic Concept” highlighted the following essential revisions: 1) NATO’s core 
functions were reafiBrmed and a new task o f dialogue and cooperation with non-NATO 
members was ^ e e d  upon. 2) The old static linear defense was replaced through 
enhanced flexibility and mobility, and the need for increased reliance on multinational
forces stressed. 3) The new environment required a greater ability to build-up forces 
through reinforcement, mobilization and reconstitution. 4) The most important revision 
was the modification o f  the principle o f flexible response to reflect a reduced reliance 
on nuclear weapons. The reason for the latter was that nuclear weapon made a unique 
contribution in rendering the risks o f any aggression incalculable and unacceptable; and 
thus, remains an essential tool in preserving peace.* In sum, the “New Strategic 
Concept” recognized the need for more flexible and mobile forces to counter new 
challenges with no defined enemy.
On the other hand, the Warsaw Treaty Organization which dissolved with the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union, left the security o f Eastern and Central Europe in 
disarray and unattended. NATO, as the clear winner o f the Cold War and with its swift 
adaptation process to the post-Cold War environment received immediate attraction 
from Eastern and Central Europe. According to the Eastern and Central European 
countries’ views, their security needs would be best served and guaranteed by NATO. 
Consequently, at a summit meeting in Cracow in October 1991, an unexpected demand 
by these countries was voiced through a declaration. The declaration stated that “the 
dangers posed by the breakup o f Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union” were enormously 
high and therefore their “security would be best served by iotegration in NATO.” The 
declaration, which urged for “fiill membership o f NATO for aU European coimtries”, 
was announced by the Presidents o f Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland.* However, 
the conjuncture at that particular time, did not make it appropriate for NATO to 
entertain the request o f these countries towards membership.
In November 1991, NATO established the North Atlantic Cooperation Coimcil 
(NACC) to satisfy the security concerns of the former states o f the Soviet Union. 
When NATO realized that these particular needs could not be answered by NACC, it
decided to launch the Partnership for Peace process. At various intervals, pressures 
came from Eastern and Central European countries for admittance into NATO, which 
forced the Alliance to consider the expansion o f NATO. The Final Communiqué o f the 
Ministerial meeting o f the North Atlantic Council dated December 1, 1994, is a major 
turning point in Alliance history regarding the enlargement issue. The joint 
communiqué issued in Brussels indicated that presently it was “premature to begin 
selecting new members or even set a firm timetable for ultimate oqjansion.”’ Further, 
the admittance o f new members into NATO would be decided on a case-by-case basis. 
The decision was taken to begin an internal study on enlargement to be completed by 
1995.* With the publication o f NATO’s internal “Study on NATO Enlargement” in 
1995, it became ofificially certain that NATO would expand. The only missing part, 
which would complete the enlargement question o f “who” and “when” was then 
answered with the Madrid meeting o f 8 July 1997. In Madrid, NATO officially invited 
the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to start accession negotiations in early 
December 1997.’ Thus, the Madrid Summit has become the second timiing point in 
Alliance history in the post-Cold War era complementing its functional enlargement 
through a geographical one.
Since its establishment, NATO has been the basic pillar for European security. 
One very important assertion is that European security without NATO is not possible 
since the organization has the necessary military, political and economic leverage to 
preserve peace and security. The uncertain future o f European security worried the 
former countries o f the Soviet Union such that it led to the debate over NATO’s 
enlargement issue. Since then, the issue has become the subject o f an ever-increasingly 
heated and continuing debate between NATO, the would-be-NATO countries and 
Russia. Consequently, during various summit meetings, the alliance members sought
and discussed forms of measures for transforming NATO to meet the security interests 
not only o f its members but also o f its ex-foes.
The scope o f this thesis is to analyze NATO’s enlargement in the post-Cold 
War European security. NATO has identified its new role by way of expansion to 
include former countries o f the Soviet Union. Within the enlargement question, the 
thesis is limited in briefly assessing the military implications o f the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland who have been invited to start accession negotiations and for 
NATO. It is beyond the scope o f this thesis to evaluate imder what possible criteria 
these coimtries were invited to begin accession negotiations with NATO. Various 
scholars commonly believe that NATO’s enlargement vdU enhance the security of 
Europe. Furthermore, it is assumed that this process will solidify the transatlantic link 
and that the debates will end about NATO’s irrelevance in the post-Cold War era.
The objective o f the thesis is to highlight important aspects of the NATO 
enlargement debate. The aims are to present an in depth xmderstanding about the 
evolution, the process, the possible criteria for membership and the arguments put 
forward o f both the advocates and opponents of enlargement. Finally, the aims are to 
assess what NATO enlargement will cost and what strategic implications wiQ arise out 
o f the enlarged NATO.
The thesis consists o f four chapters. The first chapter begins with a general 
introduction on the changed strategic security environment and NATO. Discussions on 
the aims and objectives o f the thesis are also included in chapter one. The second 
chapter begins by exploring how the issue o f NATO ejqiansion evolved. Secondly, it 
continues by describing the road to expansion which started with NACC followed by 
PfP and which will continue with EAPC. Thirdly, it presents the possible criteria 
checklist that NATO might have used. Finally, the chapter ends by presenting possible
NATO enlargement alternatives suggested by various scholars and officials. The 
chapter concludes with the kind o f enlargement path NATO chose to implement its 
expansion. The third chapter presents the enlargement debate that became a worldwide 
issue. The arguments o f both the advocates for ejqjansion and the opponents o f 
ejq)ansion are presented. The fourth chapter describes the studies published by the 
Congressional Budget Office, RAND analysts and US Department o f State on the 
financial costs o f enlargement. A strategic assessment o f the countries joining NATO 
(Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland) is also presented in this chapter. An overall 
assessment on enlargement is made which concludes the chapter and the thesis by 
making a tour d’horizon regarding NATO’s future.
CHAPTER II
On the path to enlargement
2.1 Evolution of NATO enlargement issue
The origin of the NATO enlargement issue goes as far back as the Cracow 
summit meeting o f October 1991, during which particular period, NATO was busy, 
discussing its iliture. The presidents o f former Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland 
met in Cracow and urged for full membership of NATO. Two important events were 
behind these countries' sudden urge for full membership. The reasons are clearly stated 
in the Cracow declaration. Prior to this meeting, drastic events took place in the 
Balkans and in Russia that had made these countries come together to issue this 
declaration. The Yugoslav crisis presented an immediate territorial security risk to 
Himgary since it had shared borders with the Former Yugoslavia but to a significantly 
lesser degree to former Czechoslovakia^ and Poland. Hypothetically, the spill over o f 
the crisis in Former Yugoslavia to neighboring countries could have involved the 
whole region in a domino wave. The second event, which was the anti-Gorbachev 
coup o f August 1991, if successful, could have meant the return o f the Cold War. 
Clearly, the Visegrad countries wanted NATO to realize that the New World Order 
was full o f imcertainties and that it would be in the interest of the West that they be 
integrated with the Western economic and military institutions as soon as possible.
Their urge for actual membership was not granted; nevertheless the declaration 
was successful in leading to discussions worldwide about NATO’s expansion 
eastwards. The expansion debate continued at a period, in which NATO had begun to 
work on the establishment o f the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). NATO 
thought that with the establishment o f NACC the former Warsaw Pact countries would 
end their request o f NATO membership. However, following events disproved this 
assumption and the organization foimd itself debating the ejqjansion issue as welL
“In December 1992, Albania became the first former Warsaw country to apply 
formally for NATO membership.”  ^ The Czech Republic, Himgary and Poland made 
further appeals for early membership but NATO continued to refuse any kind o f early 
admittance. Meanwhile, Moscow realized NATO’s seriousness on the expansion issue. 
Firstly, President Yeltsin approved the inclusion o f Poland into NATO while on a visit 
to Warsaw on 25 August 1993. On his return to Moscow, the military pressured him 
to make a sharp turn into disapproving Poland’s membership, and he began pressuring 
NATO countries to delay any early membership. Within that context in late September 
1993, President Boris Yeltsin wrote to the leaders o f Germany, France, the United 
Kingdom and the United States. Yeltsin stated that such a move by NATO would 
constitute a violation o f the 1990 Treaty on the Final Settlement on Germany.^
During the Brussels meeting o f the North Atlantic Council, which took place in 
December 1993, the Partnership for Peace (PfP) was launched. The PfP too, fell short 
o f the expectations the interested NATO aspirants had.^ There was no mention o f firm 
security guarantees, timetable or list o f possible candidates. The only positive side of 
the PfP was that active participation could be evaluated as a criterion for NATO 
membership. This argument is clearly hinted at in the Study on NATO Enlargement, 
which states that
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“active participation in PfP will play an important role in possible 
new members’ preparation to join the Alliance, although it will not 
guarantee Alliance membership. Active participation in NACC/PfP 
will provide the framework for possible new members to establish 
patterns of political and military cooperation with the Alliance to 
facilitate a transition to membership.”*
During his European tour, President Clinton met with the Visegrad countries in 
Prague on 12 January 1994. Thereafter he made the statement that it was no longer a 
question o f whether NATO would enlarge but o f when and how.* On 1 December 
1994, the North Atlantic Council met in Brussels where it reafBrmed its commitment 
to e)q)ansioiL In the released Final Communiqué it was stated that NATO 
“...decided to initiate a process of examination inside the Alliance to 
determine how NATO will enlarge, the principles to guide this 
process and the implications of membership. To that end, we have 
directed the Council in Permanent Session, with the advice of the 
Military Authorities, to begin an extensive study. This will include an 
examination of how the Partnership for Peace can contribute 
concretely to this process.”’
The Council also agreed “ that it was premature to discuss the timeframe for 
enlargement or which particular countries would be invited to join the Alliance.”* 
Meanwhile Moscow increased its pressure on NATO not to ejqjand. During the CSCE 
summit meeting held in Budapest on 5-6 December 1994, President Clinton underlined 
the U.S. commitment to NATO enlargement and stated that non-NATO member states 
had no right to veto the inclusion o f new members. On the other side, President Yeltsin
stated that NATO enlargement eastwards would be perceived as a threat to Russia’s 
national interest.’
In September 1995, NATO published the “Study on NATO Enlargement” and 
shared it with interested countries. The study outlined the “why” and “how” questions 
on the enlargement o f NATO.** On 22 October 1996, President Clinton made the 
following statement:
“I want to state America’s goal: “By 1999 -  NATO’s 50* 
anniversary and 10 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall -  the first 
group of countries we invite to join should be full-fledged members
ofNATO.”**
In December 1996, at the Foreign Ministers meeting the decision was made 
“ ...that the next phase of enlargement process would consist of three 
elements: intensified, individual dialogue with interested Partners; 
further consideration of what NATO must do internally to ensure 
that enlargement preserves the effectiveness of the Alliance; and 
further enhancement of the Partnership for Peace to help those 
interested Partners to prepare to assume the responsibilities of 
membership and to strengthen long-term partnership with others.”*^
Finally, on 8 July 1997 in Madrid at the Heads of State and Government 
meeting, the invitation was made to the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to begin 
accession talks. It was stated that the Alliance’s goal was to sign the Protocol o f 
Accession at the time o f the ministerial meetings in December 1997.*^
10
2.2 Whether to expand NATO
2.2.1 North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)
The mounting concerns o f Central and Eastern Europe about their insecurity 
led to the joint German-American initiative for the establishment o f the NACC. “The 
integration into the NACC o f the new states which have emerged on the territory of 
the former USSR is intended as a stabilization measure.”*“* These countries were 
shaken off further by the anti-Gorbachev coup o f August 1991 that questioned whether 
the path to democracy in Russia was going to be successful. The decision by NATO 
members not to extend security guarantees to Eastern Europe was disappointing to 
them. It was during the Rome Summit o f November 1991 that NATO decided to 
establish NACC, to reduce the insecurity concerns brought forward by the Central and 
Eastern European coimtries. The NACC was of particular importance because it was a 
forum, which brought together the ex-blocs and encouraged cooperation. It also 
promoted imderstanding and trust by increasing transparency and knowledge o f one 
another.*®
The NACC not only began securing NATO's future but also making its links 
with Central and Eastern Europe officially. The participants had agreed that there was 
a need to develop a more institutional relationship of consultation on political and 
security issues. This included annual meetings with the NATO Council at foreign 
minister level, bimonthly meetings with the NATO Council at the level o f NATO 
permanent representatives, regular meetings with NATO subordinate committees, 
meetings with the Military Committee and other military commands as well as with
11
NATO's committee of national policy plaimers and the Atlantic Policy Advisory
Group 16
NACC's consultation and cooperation were to focus on security and related 
issues like defense planning, conceptual approaches to arms control, democratic 
concepts of civil-military relations, and conversion o f military production as well as 
participation in NATO's environmental programs/’ Detailed examples of NACC 
activities are given below:
•  “Political consultation
Regular consultations on political and security-related matters, 
including regional issues. The North Atlantic Council met with 
Ambassadors o f NACC/PfP Cooperation countries and the NATO  
Political Committee met with Partner Representatives at least every 
other month. A number o f other NATO committees subordinate to 
the Council also met regularly with Cooperation Partner 
representatives.
•  Economic issues
The Economic Committee’s work with Cooperation Partners focuses 
on defense budgets and their relationship with the economy; security 
aspects o f economic developments; and defense conversion issues.
Expert meetings, seminars and workshops are held to address these 
subjects. Databases and pilot projects are being developed in the filed 
o f defense conversion with a view to their practical applications in 
Cooperation Partner countries. The annual NATO Colloquium on 
economic developments in Partner countries also brings together 
experts for exchanges o f views on relevant economic topics.
•  Information matters
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In the field o f  information, the NATO Committee on Information and 
Cultural Relations met with representatives o f Cooperation Partners 
annually to discuss the implementation o f information activities 
foreseen in the NACC Work Plan. Cooperative programs organized 
by the NATO Office o f Information and Press include visits, co­
sponsored seminars and conferences, publications and Democratic 
Institutions Fellowships. Assistance is provided by Liaison 
Embassies o f Cooperation Partner countries in Brussels and by 
Contact Point Embassies o f NATO countries in Partner capitals.
•  Scientific and environmental issues
The NACC Work Plan provided for meetings o f NATO’s Committee 
on the Challenges o f Modem Society (CCMS) with Cooperation 
Partners at least once a year. An extensive program o f  cooperative 
activities in scientific and environmental affairs focuses on such 
priority areas as disarmament technologies, environmental security, 
high technology, science and technology policy, and computer 
networking. In addition, NATO Science Fellowships are awarded to 
both NATO and Cooperation Partner scientists for study or research.
Several hundred scientists from Cooperation Partner countries now 
participate in NATO’s scientific and environmental programs.”’*
NACC was useful because it was possible to coordinate the policy o f member states on 
specific issues, such as making successor states o f the Soviet Union assume obligations 
incurred by the Soviet Union on arms control and related issues. Forty countries had 
joined the NACC that was nothing more than a consultation forum (see Table 1). It is 
o f importance to mention that apart fi'om only a few concrete functions it did not even 
give any formal security guarantees. Although, it may seem that NACC was not of
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importance, it had “provided a forum for discussions between Moscow, Kiev and 
Washington over the disposition o f the nuclear missiles vdiich Ukraine inherited from 
the Soviet Union.”*’ To some extent, the NACC hoped to achieve a European security 
order designed to reinforce stability in Europe. Further, it was hoped the desire by 
these countries to join NATO would be compensated for by NACC membership. 
NATO at that time rejected the admittance o f new members because it held the view 
that these states would alter its basic character, since the inclusion o f up to twenty new 
members could complicate, if not paralyze, the decision-making process.“
Table 1; Member Cotmtries of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council
Albania Armenia Azerbaijan Belarus
Bulgaria Czech Republic Estonia Georgia
Hungary Kazakhstan Kyrgzstan Latvia
Lithuania Moldova Poland Romania
Russia Slovakia Slovenia The former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia
Tajikistan Turkmenistan Ukraine Uzbekistan
NACC included 16 ΝΑΊro countries as well as Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland who had
observer status as participants in PfP.
Critiques o f NACC have suggested that its creation was an attempt by NATO 
to convince Eastern European members to feel involved in NATO. Although NACC 
e)q)anded its scope o f  NATO/NACC activities to cover areas such as political and 
security issues, defense planning and military matters, defense conversion, economic 
issues and the dissemination o f  information, it still remained an institution with little 
impact. One reason for the latter argument is that NACC did not have a budget. The 
only funds come from members in the committees who individually decide how much 
o f their budget will be allocated for a particular activity. A second reason is that NACC
14
does not have a formalized managerial structure. An attempt to create one feiled 
because there were jSnancial disagreements on the funding o f such a structure. A third 
reason is that the NACC Secretariat is not dedicated. Lastly, NACC is lacking a central 
doctrine. The statement o f pmpose is too vague as it states that the aim is one o f 
“contributing to the establishment o f an irreversible and effective democratic process in 
the new republics.” Simon Duke has stated rightly that NACC is suffering from “acute 
institutional schizophrenia” because the Central European states are pushing NACC to 
become a security institution rather than being a forum for cooperation and 
consultation.** On the other hand, Asmus, Kugler and Larrabee in their article 
“Building a New NATO”, talk o f NACC as being “only [a] meager psychological 
reassurance”, and perhaps supporting a more active role o f NACC.“  The final meeting 
o f the NACC took place in Sintra, Portugal on 30 May 1997 followed by the inaugural 
meeting o f the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC).
2.2.2 Partnership for Peace (PfP)
At the October 1993 NATO, ministerial meeting, Les Aspin, the US Secretary 
o f Defense proposed a Partnership for Peace between NATO and Eastern Europe. 
While PfP members were not enjoying NATO's Article V guarantee, they were entitled 
to consult with the alliance concerning any threats to their security. This entitlement is 
rather an Article IV replicate which states that “The Parties will consult together 
whenever, in the opinion o f any o f them, the territorial integrity, political independence 
or security o f any o f the Parties is threatened.” The PfP would also benefit NATO 
members because such an arrangement would generate stability.“  The P ff continues to
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build a comprehensive Euro-Atlantic architecture o f security and at the same time 
avoid early decisions being taken on NATO enlargement.
It was during the heads o f state and government participation o f 11 January 
1994 that the PfP was launched officially.^^ The declaration released stated that the 
“PfP goes beyond dialogue and cooperation to forge a real partnership.”*® Further, it 
stated that
“we expect and would welcome NATO expansion that would reach 
to democratic states o f our East, as part o f an evolutionary process, 
taking into account political and security developments in the whole 
o f Europe.... Active participation in the Partnership for Peace will 
play an important role in the evolutionary process o f the expansion o f
NATO. ,26
The declaration simply meant that other European states had the right to join NATO, if 
it was felt that they could enhance the security o f the Alliance. NATO's Article 10 
clearly pronounces such a possibility as it declares that
“the Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other 
European State in a position to further the principles o f this Treaty 
and to contribute to the security o f the North Atlantic area to accede 
to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become party to the Treaty 
by depositing its instrument o f accession with the Government o f the 
United States o f America. The Government o f  the United States o f  
America will inform each o f the Parties o f the deposit o f each 
instrument o f accession.”
By 1995, the following states had previously sought membership in NATO, however 
they were refused: “Albania, the Baltic States, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Romania and Slovakia.”*’
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Table 2: Participants o f the Partnership for Peace
Albania Armenia Austria Azerbaijan
Belarus Bulgaria Czech Republic Estonia
Finland Georgia Hungary Kazakhstan
Kyrgzstan Latvia Lithuania Moldova
Poland Romania Russia Slovakia
Slovenia Sweden Switzerland The former Yugoslav 
Republic o f Macedonia
Turkmenistan Ukraine Uzbekistan
The invitation to PfP offered six areas of cooperation to all “able and willing” 
countries. The following are the areas o f cooperation and it should be noted that some 
areas were also offered within the NACC and CSCE: -
“(1) Transparency in national defense planning and budgeting 
processes
(2) Ensuring democratic control o f defense forces
(3) Maintaining the capability and readiness to contribute to 
operations under the authority o f the United Nations or their 
responsibility o f the CSCE
(4) Developing cooperative military relations with NATO for the 
purpose o f joint planning, training and exercises in order to 
strengthen the ability to undertake missions in peacekeeping, search 
and rescue, humanitarian operations and such other areas as might 
subsequently be agreed
(5) Developing over the longer-term forces better able to operate with 
those o f NATO member states
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(6) Consultations with NATO for any active participant if it
perceived a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political 
• 28independence or secunty.”
The countries accepting the invitation were required to
“agree to abide by the principles laid out in the UN Charter, the 
Helsinki Final Act and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, 
with special mention o f the need to refrain from the use o f force 
against the territorial integrity o f any state, to respect existing
29borders and to settle disputes by peaceful means.”
The Parties who signed the PfP were offered offices at NATO headquarters and a 
Partnership Coordination Cell adjacent to SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied 
Powers Europe). NATO officers and planners from partner nations would then put 
forward the program drawn up to NATO and governments o f the applicants for 
approval and implementation. On January 26 1994, Romania became the &st nation to 
sign the PfP Framework Document.
As stated before, security guarantees are not offered to PfP members but 
having signed the PfP could be criteria for future membership to NATO. The main task 
of PfP was and still is to achieve interoperability among the non-NATO countries. 
However, the PfP was just as disappointing as NACC to Central and Eastern European 
countries. This process was seen by them as delaying the issue of ejqjansion. The 
countries that have joined the PfP are to submit their Presentation Documents to 
NATO. These documents include the resources, which a country has set out to 
contribute to PfP activities, as well as political goals, which it wants to achieve. It is 
“on the basis o f these documents [that] each partner works with the alliance to develop 
an Individual Partnership Program (IPP).” ®^ The IPP concluded by Poland with NATO
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emphasized modernization o f air defense and interoperabOity of  
command and control systems, and Poland sought to have liaison 
offices established not just at NATO and SHAPE but in the major 
subordinate commands, as well as some kind o f security guarantee 
pending full mwnbership (although the latter was not formally 
proposed to NATO).” *^
Although Central and Eastern European states have been critical o f the PfP, 
Richard Holbrooke in his article, “America, a European Power”, has different views. 
Holbrooke refers to the PfP as a “creative new concept [and] innovative idea [that] has 
become an integral part o f the European Security scene.” He states that the “PfP is not 
a single organization [but] a series o f individual agreements between NATO” and 
countries who have signed up. According to Holbrooke, the “PfP is an invaluable tool 
that encourages NATO and individual partners to work together”. He holds the view 
that the PfP will “restructure and establish democratic control o f their military forces 
and [PfP members will] learn new forms o f military doctrine, environmental control, 
and disaster relief” Holbrooke proudly talks about the first joint military exercises held 
in Poland, the Netherlands, and the north Atlantic and how valuable the results were. 
“A defense planning and review process has been established within the partnership to 
advance con^atibility and transparency between allies and partners.” He terms the PfP 
as a “vehicle” that will make them learn “about NATO procedures and standards, thus 
helping each partner make an informed decision as to whether it wishes to be 
considered for membership in the alliance.” The P ff will also “provide a fi*amework in 
which NATO and individual partners can operate in crisis management or out-of-area 
peacekeeping.” Holbrooke concludes that the P ff will judge each partner’s ability 
when assuming obligations and commitments in the partnership process. He refers to
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this as being “a testing ground for their capabilities”. He has also ejqiressed the view 
that not all PfP members wiU become NATO members. Nevertheless, one thing 
Holbrooke is sure o f is that for those who will join NATO, the PfP will continue to be 
a “building block for European Secixrity.”^^
Critiques argue that the PfP fells short of its true goal o f forging a real 
partnership. The assumption is due to the argument that a real partnership would 
involve full and equal membership in the Alliance with full security guarantees. 
However, the message behind the summit was that those states participating in the PfP 
activities could be considered for membership. Critiques further argue that, since 
Washington did not want to alienate Russia by expanding NATO eastwards, it chose to 
launch the PfP. The assumption is that now that the U.S. has given Russia a “veto 
power”, this will undermine U.S. leadership role, NATO's credibility and the PfP 
process.
2.2.3 Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)
On 30 May 1997, in Sintra Portugal, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council was 
launched as the successor o f NACC. In the Basic Document o f the EAPC, member 
countries o f NACC and PfP stated that they had decided on the establishment o f 
EAPC. What lay behind that was the determination “to raise to a qualitatively new 
level their political and military cooperation.” It is stated that EAPC “will be a new 
cooperative mechanism” forming “a framework for enhanced efforts in both an 
expanded political dimension o f partnership and practical cooperation under PfP.” 
EAPC goes beyond NACC because it is to “take full account o f and complement the 
respective activities o f the OSCE and other relevant institutions such as the European
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Union, the Western European Union and the Council o f Europe.” It was underlined 
that the EAPC will continue to promote cooperation in a transparent way. The EAPC 
also offers Partners the opporhmity for developing “a direct political relationship 
individually or in smaller groups with the Alliance.” Partner countries are allowed to 
take actively part in the decision-making “relating to activities in which they 
participate.” Two important principles will be retained by the EAPC. The first principle 
is that “it will be inclusive,” meaning that Allies and Partners will have the opportunity 
for equal political consultation and practical cooperation. The second principle is that 
“it will also maintain self-differentiation,” meaning that the level and areas o f 
cooperation with NATO will be left to the decision o f the Partners.
It is foreseen that the EAPC is to meet, as required, in four different formats as 
given below:
•  “In plenary session to address political and security-related 
issues o f common concern and to provide information as 
appropriate on activities with limited participation.
•  In a limited format between the Alliance and open-ended groups 
of Partners to focus on functional matters or, on an ad hoc basis, 
on appropriate regional matters. In such cases, the other EAPC 
members will be kept informed about the results.
•  In a limited format between the Alliance and groups o f Partners 
who participate with NATO in a peace support operation, in the 
Plamiing and Review Process, or in other cases for which this 
format has been agreed. The other members o f the EAPC will be 
informed as appropriate.
•  In an individual format between the Alliance and one Partner.
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On a monthly basis, the EAPC will meet at the Ambassadorial level. At both 
the Foreign Ministers and Defense Ministers level, the Coxmcil will meet twice a year. 
Meetings at the level o f Heads o f State or Government can take place when 
appropriate. The Secretary General o f NATO or his Deputy are to chair the Cormcil. It 
is envisaged that the NACC Work Plan for Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation is 
to be adopted by the EAPC as its future work plan. “Present NACC members and PfP 
participating coimtries automatically become members o f the EAPC if they so desire.” 
Accession to EAPC is open to other participating states at the OSCE. Two conditions 
are set for membership at EAPC. The first condition is that new members have to join 
the Partnership for Peace by signing the PflP Framework Document. The second 
condition is that they have to state their acceptance o f the concept o f the EAPC. 
Finally, the EAPC will endorse the accession o f its new members.^^
Table 3; Member Countries o f the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
1 Albania Armenia Austria Azerbaijan
Belarus Bulgaria Czech Republic Estonia
Finland Georgia Hungary Kazakhstan
Kyrgzstan Latvia Lithuania Moldova
Poland Romania Russia Slovakia
Slovenia Sweden Switzerland The former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia
Tajikistan Turkmenistan Ukraine Uzbekistan
Note: EAPC includes 16 NATO countries
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2.3 Possible criteria for NATO membership
Since the issue o f enlargement o f NATO has been on the agenda no firm 
criteria for NATO membership has been spelled out. However, in the “Study on 
NATO Enlargement,” especially Chapter 5 can be viewed as some sort o f a criteria 
checklist. It is openly stated that new members have to accept the principles, policies 
and procedures that have been already accepted by all members o f the Alliance at the 
time that new members join. Aspiring candidates should be willing and able “to meet 
such commitments, not only on paper but in practice which would be a critical fector in 
any decision to invite a coimtry to join.” *^ The study indicates that “there is no fixed or 
rigid list o f criteria for inviting new members to join the Alliance, possible new member 
states will, nevertheless be expected (politically) to:
•  Conform to basic principles embodied in the Washington Treaty: 
democracy, individual liberty and the rule o f law;
•  Accept NATO as a community o f like-minded nations joined 
together for collective defense and the preservation o f peace and 
security, with each nation contributing to security and defense 
from which all member nations benefit;
•  Be firmly committed to principles, objectives and undertakings 
included in the Partnership for Peace Framework Dociunent;
•  Commit themselves to good faith efforts to build consensus 
within the Alliance on all issues, since consensus is the basis o f  
Alliance cohesion and decision-making;
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Undertake to participate fully in the Alliance consultation and 
decision-making process on political and security issues of  
concern to the Alliance;
Establish a permanent representation at NATO HQ;
Establish an appropriate national military representation at 
SHAPE/SACLANT;
Be prepared to nominate qualified candidates to serve on the 
International Staff and in NATO agencies;
Provide qualified personnel to serve on the International Military 
Staff and in the Integrated Military Structure if and as 
appropriate;
Contribute to Alliance Budgets, based on budget shares to be 
agreed;
Participate, as appropriate, in the exchange o f Allied intelligence, 
which is based entirely on national contributions;
Apply NATO security rules and procedures;
Accept the Documents which provide the basis for the existing 
policies o f the Alliance;
Have demonstrated a commitment to and respect for OSCE 
norms and principles, including the resolution o f ethnic disputes, 
external territorial disputes including irredentist claims or 
internal jurisdictional disputes by peaceful m eans,...
Have shown a commitment to promoting stability and well-being 
by economic liberty, social justice and environmental 
responsibility;
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•  Have established appropriate democratic and civilian control o f  
their defense force;
•  Have undertaken a commitment to ensure that the adequate 
resources are devoted to achieving the obligations^*
Militarily new members were ejqjected to “be prepared to share the roles, risks, 
responsibilities, benefits, and burdens o f common security and collective defense” and 
subscribe to the Alliance’s new Strategic Concept. Most important o f all new members 
were to achieve the minimum level o f interoperability required for military 
effectiveness. It is stated that the PfP cooperation can inprove the interoperability o f 
aspiring members. Beyond this ejqjectation list, NATO announced nothing else.’’
2.4 How to enlarge NATO, the alternatives
Scholars and officials have presented various enlargement options. In this, 
section two enlargement options o f officials, the publicly known enlargement options 
o f the senior RAND officials and NATO’s own path to enlargement will be presented.
2.4.1 Enlargement alternative of Senator Sam Nunn38
At the SACLANT seminar 95, Norfolk, Virginia, on 22 June 1995 Sam Nunn, 
the Senator from Georgia, proposed a two-track approach to NATO enlargement. The 
senator stated that the first-track approach would be evolutionary. Meaning that 
enlargement would depend on the political and economic developments in the 
interested countries. He suggested those countries aspiring for NATO membership 
should first join the European Union and then the Western European Union. This
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process would prepare them for NATO membership and connect economic and 
security interests. At the same time, this process would convince Moscow that NATO 
enlargement is not aimed against them
The second-track approach, according to Senator Nunn would be threat-based. 
NATO would enlarge immediately depending on Russia’s behavior. He states that 
NATO should enlarge in any o f the following cases:
• “aggressive moves against other sovereign states
• military significant violations o f your [Russia] arms control 
and other legally binding obligations pertinent to the 
security o f Europe
• the emergence o f a non-democratic Russian government 
that impedes for elections, suppresses domestic freedoms, 
or institutes a foreign policy incompatible with the existing 
European security system ”*’
2.4.2 Enlargement alternative of H. Plater-Zyberk.40
H. Plater-Zyberk, author o f the paper on “NATO enlargement- Benefits, Costs 
and Consequences”, presents three possible alternatives for NATO enlargement. In the 
first option, the author states that NATO could enlarge with unchanged aims and 
priorities. The imchanged aims and priorities include the contribution to enhanced 
stability and security for all countries in the Euro-Atlantic area and the description o f 
NATO remaining as a purely defensive alliance. This also includes the provisions o f 
Article 5 o f the 1949 Treaty o f Washington. The author believes that this version
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would reqiiire a substantial contribution by the new members to collective defensive. 
The author states that there would be no obligations by new members to accept 
nuclear weapons or foreign troops on their soil as a priori. However, he points at the 
possibility o f the requirement o f building storage facilities and accoirqjanying 
infrastructure able to accommodate various NATO troops and weapons. The author 
does not exclude the possibility o f the establishment o f an air defense system pointing 
east rather than west.
In the second option, the author proposes an enlarged NATO vrithout the 
security guarantee o f Article 5. Instead, he states that this guarantee o f Article 5 be 
dropped or reworded for new members. This would make the newcomers second-class 
members. In this option, the defense infrastructure needed by NATO in these countries 
would be delayed pending full membership. However, NATO would assist the new 
members in modernizing their armed forces and developing interoperability at aU levels. 
The author states that this option could be acceptable to Moscow but not to the 
newcomers. This option is described as a trial period, during which the individual 
candidates would be tested. Finally, the candidates would receive full membership 
either after the trial period or because o f a drastic change in Europe.
The final enlargement option that the author regards as the least likely, states 
that enlargement would involve substantial changes to the Washington Treaty. The 
author indicates that in this case the new members would join a different NATO, which 
would guarantee their security on paper. NATO would not help them in the 
development o f a common defense infrastructure. Russia would join this different 
organization as a senior partner without being a member o f the organization.
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2.4.3 Enlargement alternative of the senior RAND anaiysts41
In their article “NATO expansion: the next steps” the senior RAND analysts 
Asmus, Kugler and Larrabee presented three alternative paths to NATO enlargement. 
These alternatives are referred to as the evolutionary expansion, promote stability and 
strategic response.
2.4.3.1 Evolutionary Expansion
The assumption o f the evolutionary path is that East-Central Europe &ces 
problems o f an economic and political nature. Therefore, there is no need to a speedy 
NATO enlargement. The solution o f the economic and political problems can be best 
addressed by integration into the European Union (EU). In this path, NATO 
membership is seen as secondary to membership in the EU. The enlargement process 
o f the EU and NATO are seen as complementary and mutually supportive. Through 
the choice o f this path, the Alliance would win time for preparing the new members for 
NATO. This path emphasizes the “go-slow” approach to reduce any confrontation 
with Moscow over expansion. At the same time, NATO would be freed from any 
back-door commitments through possible membership in the WEU. The commitments 
could arise when the East-Central European countries would join the EU followed by 
the WEU vwthout still being members o f NATO. By linking NATO membership to the 
European Union, NATO would not have the authority on the decision when 
newcomers would be accepted. This situation would take NATO expansion hostage to 
the EU expansion policies that could be extremely dangerous and undermining to 
NATO credibility. The authors set the timeframe o f this path for NATO membership to 
ten years.
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2.4.3.2 Promote Stability
On the other hand, the promote stability path assumes that the immediate 
problems o f East-Central Europe are due to the lack o f a security vacuum between 
Germany and Russia. However, on many occasions Germany stated that it has no 
intentions whatsoever to fill in the security vacuum. This path argues that democracy 
and security are closely linked. Meaning that a strong security fimnework would 
develop into stable democracies. This argument is based on the historic example o f 
post-W ar II West Germany in which NATO stabilized German democracy. It is argued 
that integration into the EU would only solve the economic problems o f the countries, 
but not their security needs. Furthermore, NATO should not have to wait until the EU 
expands. This alternative would answer the political and security needs East-Central 
European countries are aspiring for. At the same time, NATO itself would decide the 
criteria and timetable for ejqjansion. This path would also force the United States to 
take a firm lead in the enlargement issue. However, this alternative would receive 
criticism, opposition and reactions from Moscow. According to this path, criteria for 
membership would be based on strategic priorities, which would place Poland on the 
top o f the list o f candidates for NATO membership. The timefi’ame o f this path is set to 
three to five years (before the year 2000) followed by the expansion o f the EU.
2.4.3.3 Strategic Response
The authors have termed the final path as the strategic response. This path 
advocates a “wait-and-see” policy for NATO expansion. The enlargement o f NATO is 
directly linked to Russian behavior. In case Moscow pursues aggressive policies and
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poses a military threat then NATO e)qjansion would be inevitable. This path argues 
that early ejq)ansion o f NATO would destabilize democratic reforms already underway 
in Moscow. However, it cautions that NATO should be prepared for immediate 
expansion in case Russia changes. In this path, the PfP process is viewed as an interim 
step towards expansion, this would help prepare East-Central Europe for NATO 
membership. The strategic response path would not satisfy the current security 
concerns brought forward by East-Central Europe, which could overshadow their 
reform process. The timeframe o f this path for NATO membership would be strictly 
linked to Moscow’s behavior.
2.4.4 N A TO ’s own path to enlargement
NATO’s own path to enlargement resembles the promote stability path 
suggested by the senior RAND analysts. NACC, PfP and EAPC can be evaluated as 
part o f the enlargement process. Although, when NACC was launched NATO did not 
plan NACC to play an active role in the enlargement process. On the other hand, PfP 
and EAPC are seen as an interim step towards enlargement. NATO systematically built 
the foundations o f enlargement. At times, NATO received criticisms from East-Central 
European countries because the process was seen as too slow and received criticisms 
from Moscow that the process was too fest. On many occasions NATO imderlined that 
enlargement rendered the idea o f new dividing lines in Europe obsolete and that NATO 
enlargement should be seen as an evolutionary process. Within that context, NATO 
stated that enlargement is not directed against Moscow, although Yeltsin argued that 
enlargement would be regarded as a threat to Russia.
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The United States took a firm lead in the enlargement process as President 
Clinton announced that the first group o f countries would be full-fledged members by 
1999. The U.S. also pressured NATO that only the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland would be invited to jo ia  Furthermore, it was indicated in the “Study o f NATO 
enlargement” that “new members would benefit fi"om all the rights and assume all the 
obligations under the Washington Treaty.” On 8 July 1997, in Madrid, NATO formally 
invited the Czech Republic, Himgary and Poland to begin accession negotiations with 
NATO. The dates o f accession negotiation were set to begin in December 1997. By 
the year 1999, these countries would be fiiU-fledged members o f NATO. Eight days 
later, on 16 July 1997, the European Union invited the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Estonia, Slovenia and Cyprus to begin accession negotiations as early as 
1998.^ ^ Between the years 2001-2003, it is expected that these countries will become 
full members o f the EU. This demonstrates that the enlargement o f NATO and EU are 
moving in a parallel direction as many scholars had suggested over the years during the 
NATO enlargement debate.
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Figure 1: Map o f countries invited to  jo in  by NATO and EU
. , . . .· \· ·/;· ·■
\  \ C .
Legend: countries circled in blue color are invited to join by NATO 
and the ones circled in green are invited to jo in  by EU; NATO 
countries are shown in full blue color
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CHAPTER III
The enlargement debate
3.1 Proponents of enlargement
3.1.1 Russia's gloomy future
Advocates o f expansion advance the argument that Russia’s future is full o f 
uncertainties and therefore NATO has to expand. Although one may argue that 
President Boris Yeltsin is pushing for democratic reforms in Russia, the world does not 
know how successful they are going to be or even whether these reforms will continue. 
In the near past, Russia experienced an anti-Gorbachev coup that fortunately failed. 
What if a second coup attempt takes place but this time is victorious? What will 
happen to Russia? Will it continue to be peaceful?’
Another justification for ejqDansion is the outcome o f the 1993 elections in 
Russia. Vladimir Zhirinovsky, a “national populist demagogue” who clearly won the 
elections, toppled the calculations for reforms in Russia. Zhirinovsky's success to many 
signaled the possibility o f a revival o f Russian imperialism for the coming years, thus 
underlining the vitality o f NATO expansion.^ This clear win by Zhirinovsky, who got 
23 percent o f the national vote, struck the West even more by his vicious statements as 
he issued threats to “nuke” Japan and Germany, and went as far as stating that he
would try to “annihilate NATO”. These statements by Zhirinovsky led to immediate 
comparisons with Adolf Hitler. What if in the near future, Zhirinovsky or like-minded 
people came to power in Russia? Would Russia continue to be a friend? If  such a man 
like him could get majority votes that easily, than the West could be justified in o f 
expanding NATO now rather than in the future which could be too late.^
Some advocates have pointed out that Russia has been pursuing a more 
assertive policy towards ex-Soviet republics. Their argument is that Moscow has re­
established control over parts o f Central Asia and the Caucasus. They refer to this as 
the Russian “Near Abroad”“* policy. Peter Rodman, states that “Russia is already 
getting back on its feet geopolitically, even before it gets back on its feet 
economically.”® Therefore, by way o f expansion NATO has to counterbalance Russian 
action. The Chechnian incident for example was evaluated by some in the West as not 
being democratic at all. Chechnia as argued by Russia is a domestic concern and should 
not be o f any concern to the West.
One striking argument is that Russia now is very weak and therefore, NATO 
should use this advantage to expand. Henry Kissinger argues that Russian opposition 
to enlargement will continue to grow as its economy recovers. Enlargement has to be 
pursued as soon as possible because Russia would be in no position to do anything 
against the expansion process in its current state o f being.® Finally, NATO might not 
get such an advantage o f being superior to Moscow again.
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Advocates o f NATO expansion advance the argument that currently there is a 
power vacuum existing in Europe. Therefore, NATO should expand to fill in this 
power vacuum.’ The candidates for this task are pointed out to be either Russia or 
Germany. A competition among them can even lead to a conflict that may involve 
NATO action. Germany is shown as a stronger candidate for this task though it does 
not seem to advocate this. However, it wants “its firontiers with the Czech Republic 
and Poland” to be stable against any refugee inflow o f people fleeing fi*om economic 
and political problems.*
Germany also fears the possibility o f a Russian aggression on Central and 
Eastern European countries. I f  aggression takes place, expanding later will have no 
advantage at all. Another argument is that “if Russia adopts aggressive policies and if 
NATO fails to extend security commitments to the Visegrad” countries, then Germany 
may establish bilateral security ties with them to fill in the “security vacuum”.’
Russia on the other hand is “in the midst o f sensitive and complex national” 
redefinition. The political and economic instability in Russia may cause it to inclem ent 
harsher foreign policy objectives in order to preserve Russian superpower status in 
Europe. The debate between Westemists (Europeanists) and Euroasianists continues, 
and the later seem to be gaining stronger ground. The Euroasianists advocate for a 
stronger Russian presence, which may lead Russia to try to fill in the existing power 
vacuum in Europe.*®
3.1.2 Power vacuum
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It is argued that there is instability existing in Europe and a NATO expansion 
would enhance stability. Secretary-General Javier Solana sees enlargement as NATO’s 
new role in safeguarding ‘stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area’. He believes 
that coimtering instability is NATO’s natural response in the post-Cold War era.“  
Instability in the region is caused by factors such as nationalism, economic and political 
pitfalls. Examples o f instability “are ethnic problems in Estonia and Latvia; Ukraine has 
ethnic difficulties in Crimea and severe economic problems”.“
Advocates for ejqjansion usually advance the argument that states belonging 
“to a secure European and Western political, economic and military community” will 
succeed in ensxiring democracy. This assumption is supported by the example o f West 
Germany who has become a stable democracy by being in NATO. “Similarly, NATO 
membership helped stabilize democracy and stem authoritarian backsliding in Portugal, 
Spain, Greece and Turkey.” Asmus, Kugler and Larrabee further argue that since 
“democratic credentials” are insisted upon “prior to alliance membership, [NATO] 
should remember that the need for a stable security framework is greatest when 
democracy is most fragile and threatened.”“
3.1.3 Instability in Europe
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It is argued that psychological reassurance is needed to be given to the East by 
expanding NATO. In addition, the argument rests on the presunption that it will take 
considerable time until they will reach the “economic and political standards o f the 
European Union”. Therefore, there is the need to give them reassurance for 
prospective full integration into the West. Once NATO membership is guaranteed, then 
it is certain that EU membership will take place, thus closing the gap o f being apart 
from Europe. Reassurance will motivate Eastern and Central European countries to 
become more eager in the implementation o f continuing democratic reforms. Further, 
these countries especially Poland, Himgary, the Czech and Slovak republics have been 
“historically, politically, culturally and economically linked with Western Europe”. By 
not giving them reassurance through turning down their membership request, it might 
lead them to move away from the West for once and for aU. After all, the West should 
remember that these countries have spent enormous effort in breaking away from the 
Soviet Union. Rejecting, them, at a time when they desperately need Europe, might be 
the basis for which Europe will later have to pay for the consequences.*'*
3.1.4 Reassurance needed for the East
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The argument o f the political benefit o f ejqjansion rests on the presupposition 
that this will solidify the U.S. superpower position in the world. There has been since 
the end o f the Gulf War as well as within the Clinton administration considerable lack 
o f US leadership on world matters. U.S. prestige has been damaged. However, it can 
be strengthened through support for expansion o f NATO. Through the expansion o f 
NATO, the US will be able to affect more countries in Europe than previously; thus 
US leadership in Europe wiU continue to prevail. This should be viewed as a net gain 
on the side o f the US. US support and implementation o f expansion will show that the 
concept o f Pax-Americana is still alive.
The argument o f economic benefit rests on the presumption that NATO
expansion will enhance regional stability further. “Regional stability is a precondition
for economic stability and fi:ee trade.” A wider NATO that will open new markets and
secure existing markets for the US can achieve regional stability. It is worthwhile
noting that Europe is an important economic partner o f the US. Since,
“41 percent o f total US foreign investment is in the European Union 
and 53 percent o f all foreign direct investment in the US is from the 
European Union coimtries. Further, on average each $1 billion in US 
merchandise exports supports almost 20,000 jobs. These jobs pay 
about 17 percent more than the national average wage.” (These are 
the July 1994 US Department o f Commerce's survey o f Current 
Business)**
As suggested above, NATO expansion is o f vital political and economic benefit, which 
should be realized and acted upon.
3.1.5 US political and economic benefits with enlargement
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The advocates o f expansion argue that in the near future the Eastern and 
Central European countries will become members o f the EU. Thus, they will have the 
option o f joining the WEU. Some Central and Eastern European coxmtries are already 
associate members o f WEU.** Once they have joined the WEU, they will receive 
security guarantees from France and Germany that are in turn NATO members. It is 
argued that such a situation
“...could destroy the alliance. For Washington it would create a 
situation like that which existed among the European powers prior to 
World War I - where the entangling commitments o f a country 
enjoying an American guarantee could draw the United States into a 
conflict over which it had little if  any control.”
Therefore, it is preferable to have these coimtries in NATO rather than being subject to 
back-door commitments.*’
Another issue related to back-door commitments can arise out o f bilateral 
security agreements, for example between Germany and Poland. Once such an 
agreement is concluded, then Germany will be committed to take part in any conflict 
that involves Poland with another party. Thus, Germany aiding Poland will pull the rest 
o f the NATO members willingly or unwillingly into the conflict. Therefore, before such 
a commitment takes place between countries in Europe, it is advisable to ejqjand 
NATO.
3.1.6 Avoiding back-door commitments
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3.2 Opponents of enlargement
3.2.1 Losing N ATO
Opponents o f expansion argue that
“the alliance does not have the means to address the political and 
economic problems that are the cause o f many ethnic disputes, nor 
does it have the political and economic levers needed to contain intra­
alliance conflicts.”**
Furthermore, it is important to realize that NATO is a collective defense organization 
where pohtical and economic problems can not be addressed. Opponents argue that the 
European Union (EU) would be the best-suited organization to counter the political 
and economic problems o f Eastern Europe. Therefore, enlargement o f the EU should 
be advocated.
Opponents advance the argument that e?q)ansion would weaken NATO's 
cohesion. The argument rests on the assumption that expansion wotild import the 
rivalries and disputes that exist among Central and Eastern European countries into*’ 
NATO. One should remember the strain placed on NATO over the years by the 
Turkish-Greek dispute which is continuing. It is argued that the historical ejqperience o f 
West Germany being in NATO had reduced any kind o f possible German aggression in 
Europe. NATO's limited success in the conflict between Turkey and Greece over 
Cyprus does not necessarily mean that the inclusion o f new members into NATO 
would solve long-standing rivalries in the Central and Eastern European region. BCarl 
H. Kamp believes that the “democratization o f Germany and the management o f the 
Turkish-Greek conflict took place under specific historical and political
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circumstances.” His argument is based on two forces that kept the aUiance intact. One 
such force has been the United States that has a dominant say in NATO due to the 
massive financial commitments it provides. The other force had been the Soviet Union 
whose threat had kept the alliance even closer.*® With the demise o f one force and the 
decreasing dominance o f the US, NATO would be in no position to achieve further 
success.
“There are no such strains between Warsaw, Prague and Budapest, 
but they do exist between Budapest and Bratislava (due to the 
Hungarian minority in Slovakia). What is more, Hungary has a 
conflict-laden relationship with Romania (due to the Himgarians in 
Transylvania) and with Serbia (due to Hungarians in Vojvodina).” *^
The incorporation o f Eastern and Central European countries into NATO would be 
extremely problematic and NATO “would not survive the outbreak o f a major 
territorial or ethnic clash among its membership.” It is suggested that “NATO would 
be no longer able to function smoothly or effectively” because it would be difficult to 
reach a “consensus decision-making.”** See Table 4 for an overview o f minority 
dispute relations o f selected coimtries in Eastern Central Europe.
Opponents further point that “new members might weaken the commitment o f 
the Alliance to the defense o f its members.” This would question the credibility o f 
newly extended security guarantees to new members. ‘Turthermore, NATO expansion 
would complicate the practicalities and politics o f the United States nuclear guarantees 
to Europe” and at the same time complicate the strategic nuclear relationship with 
Russia.** The enlargement would rather erode the alliance then bringing advantages to 
it. New members would bring new problems to NATO, which it is not prepared to deal 
with.
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Jonathan Dean argues that a bigger NATO will “entail economic obligations on 
the part o f NATO states” such as aid to the armed forces o f new members states. 
This might not be received with enthusiasm. Opponents indicate that the fragile 
economies o f Eastern Central European countries are not in a position to finance then- 
military modernizations to NATO standards alone. Neither do they have the economic 
advantage in contributing equally to NATO’s common budget.^ ® Furthermore, Article 
X states that admission o f new members requires unanimous support by the existing 
members. Karl-Heinz Kamp asserts, that it is highly unlikely that “an eastward 
ejqjansion o f NATO today would receive a ‘yes’ vote from every alliance member”. 
This, he believes is both true for important members as well as for the smaller ones to 
the south. The reason behind this belief is that “they subscribe to a risk assessment 
radically different from that o f their northern partners, since North Afiica and the 
Middle East pose more immediate threats to their security”. The most important 
reason of why mianimous support for the admittance o f new members might not be 
achieved is due to the fact that some countries in NATO are afraid “that arms 
assistance from the rich member states [to current members] would dry up once new 
members in even greater need o f financial aid then [some o f the current NATO] are 
admitted.”*® Michael Mandelbaum has the view that NATO is not an effective 
instrument for promoting either free markets or democracy and urges for the need of 
something else. He states that
“in the second half o f  the 1940s the preeminent international issue, 
the principal response - and an extremely successful one - was the 
Marshall Plan. This promoted capital market access, and incentives 
for economic cooperation, all o f  which Central Europe currently 
needs.” ’^
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Table 4: Minority dispute relations
C ountries M inoritv D ispute
Poland/Belarus
Lithuania/Ukraine
28
Territories lost by Poland in World War II left around 1.2 million Poles 
scattered throughout the former USSR.
Himgary/Romania
29
Hungary claims that between 1.5 and 2.3 million ethnic Hungarians have been 
denied economic and political rights. Rc«nania denies this. There are also 
competing claims to Transylvania arising fi‘om the 1920 Treaty of Trianon that 
took it from Hungary.
Bulgaria/Greece,
Macedonia
Bulgaria claims Macedonians are Bulgarians. Twice in the twentieth century it 
has occupied Macedonia and parts of Serbia
Albania/Serbia Albanian minorities make up almost 85 percent of the Kosova and Metohia 
region, with strong separatist tendencies. Initial demands are for the creation of 
a Kosova Republic, which would be unified with Albania. Although never part 
of Albania, it was part of the medieval Serbian Empire and the cradle of 
Serbia’s spiritual and political identity.
Greece/Albania With around 350,000 Greeks in south AJbania (known as North Epirus by 
Greeks) and an Albanian minority in Northern Greece, there have been 
spontaneous exoduses across the border.
Bulgaria/Turkey
♦
Around 10-14 percent of Bulgaria’s 9 million population are Turkish Muslims 
or Bulgarian Muslims (Pomaks). Efforts of Turks, who fled communist 
suppression in 1984-85 and 1989, to return and resume their occupations are 
creating severe tensions.
CIS/Romania Within the former Soviet Union there are around 3.3 million Moldovians and 
145,000 Romanians. Nationalists on both sides of the Prut river want a unified 
Romanian-Moldovian state.
Bulgaria/Romania Territorial disputes stem from the divided territory of Dobrudja adjacent to the 
Black Sea, most notably from the Bulgarian minority in the Romanian portion.
Source: Simon Duke. The New European Security Disorder. (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 
1994), 62.
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3.2.2 Yalta II
Opponents reason that expansion would create “a new border between the 
privileged and underprivileged countries o f Europe and would complicate Western 
relations with those countries which are excluded.” "^ While accepting the Visegrad 
countries to the alliance “the entire north-south belt o f the states from the Baltic states 
in the north, through Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Romania, Bulgaria, the Yugoslav 
successor states, Albania” and especially Russia would be dissatisfied. Jonathan Dean 
terms this situation as being “left in a no-man's land between NATO and increasingly 
resentful Russia, creating new groups o f second-class European citizen and 
strengthening negative trends in these states.”^^  Another opponent o f expansion, L. 
Ruehl cautions that an eastward expansion would create an “intermediate zone o f an 
Atlantic-Russian demarcation line across Europe, behind which the Russian Empire 
would again take shape.” This situation is popularly referred to as Yalta II. However, 
he believes that a Yalta II would not be acceptable to both the US and Russia. On the 
US part, this would mean the strategic engagement on a “hitherto unknown scale”. 
Moreover, for Russia this would mean extensive containment to which it has never 
been ejq>osed.^^
During the summit meeting o f the OSCE, in 1994, President Yeltsin issued a
warning against enlargement. He implied that NATO ejqpansion would create cold
peace between Russia and the US. He demanded that NATO put its enlargement plans
off the agenda for an indefinite period and stated the following:
“Russia also expects its security to be taken into account. We are 
concerned about the changes that are taking place in NATO. What is 
this going to mean for Russia? NATO was created during the Cold 
War. Why sow the seeds o f mistrust? After all, we are no longer 
enemies; we are all partners now.”^^
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A critical opponent o f expansion such as Mandelbaiim sees NATO expansion 
as unwise and no necessity to fill in such a security vacuum. According to him, “there 
is no such vacuum”. A security order is already in place and he points to the arms 
control accords which cover nuclear and conventional weapons and the January 1993 
START II (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) accord which covers long-range nuclear 
weapons.^“* This suggests that NATO does not need to expand to fill in the power 
vacuum. Further, neither Germany nor Russia would be in a position to fill such a 
vacuum. Dean believes that Germany is “unlikely to break out o f its integrated posture 
and its deep commitment to a multilateral approach in politics, economics and security 
to play a solo role in Europe”. As For Russia, the experience in Chechnia shows how 
weak the Russian military is. This leads to the conclusion that a weak Russia can not
3.2.3 No power vacuum
fill in such a vacuum even if it wanted to do so 35
Opponents against expansion argue that Russia should “not be isolated unless it
isolates itself by returning to the aggressive or imperialist tendencies o f the past.”
Expanding NATO now so goes the argument, would “fiiel Moscow's fears o f Western
attempts to fill the power vacuum in Eastern Europe at the expense o f Russia.” ICarl-
Hemz Kamp believes that it would be extremely difficult trying to explain
“to a humiliated Russian military establishment that an extension of 
NATO for the sake o f stabilizing Russia's western periphery would 
be net gain for them, not another defeat.” *^
NATO expansion to the east “would probably exceed the ingenuity o f even
the most eloquent NATO expansionists.’
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Opponents argue that there is no serious instability in the Visegrad countries 
and therefore, there is no need to include them in NATO. In the light o f the data 
presented there is a serious dilemma about the stabihty argument as put forward by the 
various analysts. Analysts for both the instability and stability argument have to be 
clear about their claims. Dean points out that these countries fear being “doomed to a 
replay o f the history o f repeated invasions by Russia or Germany or o f collusion by the 
two big powers to divide or dominate their countries.” *^ Michael Brown also believes 
that the Visegrad coimtries are quite stable and that expansion would be foolish. He 
states that they have few ethnic minorities and ethnic violence is virtually non-existent. 
He points to the Czech-Slovak divorce that took place peacefully. He believes that 
violent border disputes are unlikely and inter-state conflict in general is highly remote. 
Furthermore, stability according to him is already reinforced by the desire to join the 
EU (European Union). Brown reasons that since these states are determined to join the 
EU and that their chances o f being admitted are relatively high. EU membership will be 
a peaceful incentive in treating “ethnic minorities well, respecting international border 
and international norms o f behavior and conducting their internal and external affairs 
peacefvilly.” ’^
3.2.4 Europe is stable
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Opponents o f enlargement point out that in reality there are no Russian military
threats especially perceived by the Visegrad countries. The argument is that if  there
were a Russian threat, one would expect an enormous military build up in these
countries. However, the picture is o f the contrary. There is rather a military build-
down. Brown states that Poland, a country that has the most reason to fear Russia, “is
reducing conscription from 12 to 10 months.” ®^ Furthermore, “Poland's 15-division,
400,000-troop force has been reduced to 200,000. It has also been defensively
restructured and subordinated to civilian national command.” ’^ “The Czech Army has
converted one o f its three mechanized divisions into a mechanized brigade and
disbanded its infentry division.”*^  In addition,
“the Czech and Slovak Federated Republic (CSFR) is reducing its 
10-division, 200,000-troop force to between 90,000 and 100,000.
Moreover, CSFR forces have been defensively restructured and 
subordinated to civilian national command.
M ost important o f all is that none o f these armies has acquired much new equipment in 
the past year. On the eve o f such developments, this means that there is no perceived 
Russian threat, thus, no reason to expand.
Currently, opponents do not see Russia posing a military threat to Central and 
Eastern European countries. This assumption presupposes that Russia is not 
strengthening its conventional military capabilities. According to the CFE 
(Conventional Forces in Europe) Treaty Russia is to keep much o f its firepower east o f 
the Urals.
“According to authoritative sources, no Russian combat formations 
currently operate at more than 75% o f their authorized manpower
3.2.5 No Russian threat
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levels and roughly 70% o f all divisions operate at less than 50% of  
authorized levels. Moreover, Russia's military leadership is in 
disarray at both the ministerial and operational levels.”
The evidence o f the later argument is proven by the situation in Chechnia where the
Russian army was having problems in suppressing the poorly armed Chechnians.
“Western defense and intelligence experts believe that the Russian 
military is incapable o f launching a conventional offensive against 
the West and that it would take Moscow at least a year to field such 
a capability.”^
Finally, at present, Mandelbaum considers Russia “so weak, chaotic, and preoccupied 
with its internal affairs” that there is no need to rush for an expansion.'**
3.2.6 Russia’s reform process could be damaged
Opponents argue that expansion will have a negative impact upon Westem- 
Russian relations, which is currently based on peace and cooperation. Owen Harris 
argues against the expansion o f NATO from a historical perspective. He states that 
NATO expansion does not take into account “Russian susceptibilities and interests and 
envisages no role for Russia in Eastern Europe.” With enlargement, countries formerly 
under the sphere o f influence o f Russia will be included in NATO for the sake o f 
stability in the region,
“The 45-year interlude o f the Soviet bloc was merely an episode in a 
much larger history and its demise should not be taken as marking 
the end o f Moscow's involvement. Strategic interests, traditional 
motives o f prestige, the “historic mission” o f freeing the Greek 
Orthodox population from infidel rule, and the pan-Slavisim that had 
a varying but real impact on policy - all these combined to make 
Eastern Europe, and the Balkans in particular, a matter o f intense
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concern for Russia long before Lenin and Stalin appeared on the
scene.
He recommends that this history should not be ignored and that NATO should not 
attempt to incorporate Eastern Europe into its sphere o f influence. Enlargement should 
not take place “at a time when Russia is in dangerous turmoil and when that nation's 
prestige and self-confidence are badly damaged.” Harris strongly believes that this 
“would surely be an act o f outstanding folly.” He sees expansion as a catalyst that 
would lead to chauvinistic attitudes in Russia ejqiloiting “frustrations, resentments and 
wounded national pride in ways that would have unpleasant consequences both 
internally and internationally.”^
Opponents fiorther argue that enlargement o f NATO would weaken the 
position o f the democrats in Russian politics that are struggling against undemocratic 
political foes. It is assumed that an expanded NATO would be considered “illegitimate 
because it had been imposed over Russian opposition.” Yeltsin's adviser Sergei A. 
Karaganow holds the view that if “NATO expands eastwards, Russia imder any 
government will become a revisionist power striving to imdermine the already fragile 
European order.” This clearly indicates the necessity o f a green light by Moscow.“*’ 
Enlargement would bring back an authoritarian regime under the control o f radical 
nationalists and political opportunists, “who will use NATO's action to discredit the 
current leadership and its pro-W estern line.”^  So extreme has been the opposition to 
enlargement by forces in Moscow that Boris Yeltsin who was “under military 
pressure”, had “to withdraw his public approval o f Poland's bid to join NATO.” This 
shows that the Kremlin's traditional fear o f encirclement is still at its height.^’
Opponents hold the view that expansion will risk vital arms control agreements 
being ratified by Moscow. The Russian Defense Minister Panel Grachev issued a
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warning during an April visit by Perry to Moscow, that “Russia would withdraw from
the CFE Treaty and establish new military groupings in Eastern Europe.” Further,
Perry was also warned by the chairman o f the Federal CoimcU, Vladimir Shumeiko,
‘4hat friction over NATO ejqjansion could prevent the Russian legislature from
ratifying START II.”®® Such reactions by Moscow clearly indicate that
“START II, compliance with the CFE and possible follow-on 
negotiations as well as Russian cooperation on other Western 
initiatives such as weapons proliferation and political and military 
cooperation will be at potential risk.”**
Therefore, opponents argue that expansion should not take place unless Russia begins 
threatening Eastern and Central Europe.
3.2.7 Causing the incorporation of Ukraine into Russia
Opponents indicate that if  NATO ejqjands, Russia will take over Ukraine and
this will mark the beginning o f Cold War II.®^  Ukraine is currently neutral and acts as a
buffer between Russia and the West. Furthermore, Ukraine has also
“resisted to Russian pressures to integrate itself into the Moscow- 
dominated security treaty o f the Commonwealth o f Independent 
States (CIS) and it is the only former Soviet republic to have created 
a large national army.”**
During a visit by Ukrainian President Lenoid Kuchma to Prague in April 1995, he 
urged the Czechs not to rush for NATO membership. His fear was “being sandwiched 
between an expanding NATO and an increasing irate Russia.” It should be realized that 
Ukraine has been part o f Russia for over 300 years and that there are 12 million 
Russians living in Ukraine as a minority. Expansion win naturally trigger the inclusion 
o f a weak and unstable Ukraine into Russia. Such a result would be unacceptable to
the West.54
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CHAPTER IV
Burden-sharing assessment of enlargement for
NATO
The aim o f this chapter is to present the burden-sharing assessment o f both the 
costs and strategic implications for NATO enlargement. The first section will present 
the three studies on the cost o f NATO enlargement. The second section will evaluate 
the strategic implications o f enlargement and the final section will make an overall 
conclusion on the enlargement.
4.1 Cost of NATO enlargement
Now that the question in the NATO enlargement debate o f ‘whether’, ‘why’, 
‘who’ and ‘when’ are also answered the question o f what NATO enlargement will cost 
and its military implication are coming to the forefi’ont. There are several studies 
published on the financial costs o f NATO enlargement. The Congressional Budget 
OflSce (CBO) published the first study in March 1996. The Department o f State 
published a second study on 24 February 1997. Finally, the RAND analysts Asmus, 
Kugler and Larrabee published a third in autumn 1997. Among the three study’s 
estimates, the most expensive one is the CBO, which is calculated over a 15-year 
period amounting to $60-124.7 billion. The RAND Corporation’s estimate is
calculated over a 10-15 year period amounting to $10-110 billion. Finally, the US 
Department o f State’s estimate is calculated over a 13-year period amounting to $27- 
35 billion.
The first two subsections will briefly present a srraimarized overview o f the 
estimates o f the Congressional Budget Office and the RAND analysts. The third 
subsection will present the detailed study o f the US Department o f State on the 
financial costs and military implications o f enlargement. It is the policy o f the Clinton 
administration to aim for a low cost enlargement and it is likely that the enlargement 
process will follow on the broad outline o f the study.
4.1.1 Congressional Budget Office’s estimates
The study published in March 1996 estimates that the costs could range fi'om 
$60-124.7 billion over a 15-year period. The study called upon NATO to conduct its 
own cost o f analysis because “an estimate of the potential costs is critical to informed 
debate on whether the Alliance should expand. Those costs could be substantial and 
for that reason deserve analysis.”*
The study estimates that the current Allies would contribute a total between 
$18.6-72.9 bniion over 15-years. The four Visegrad countries would contribute 
between $42-51.8 billion In order to cope with the added costs o f enlargement the 
Visegrad countries would need to increase their defense expenditure between 60-80%. 
However, it is not clear whether these countries are ready to pay such high amounts o f 
costs. According to the RAND analysts, the estimates o f the CBO “are mostly driven 
by a postulated NATO strategy o f preparing for war against Russia.”^
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Table 5; Military options to expand NATO and their costs in billions ofTTS dollars^
O ption/C ost US NATO
Allies
New
Member
Total
Enhance Visegrad defense and 
fecilitate NATO supplemental 
reinforcement
4.8 (25.8) 13.8 42 .0(21 .0) 60.6
Project NATO air power eastward to 
______ defend Visegrad states______
4.6 (6.4) 10.3 3.6 (1.8) 18.6
Project power eastward with NATO 
ground forces based in Germany
3.6 (6.7) 20.3 6.2 (3.1) 30.1
Move stocks of prepositioned 
equipment to Visegrad states
0.3 (0.35) 0.9 0.1 (0.05) 1.2
Station a limited number of forces 
forward
5.5 (5.5) 8.7 0.0 (0.0) 14.2
Total 18.9(44.75) I 54.0 | 51.8(25.9) 124.7
Source: Congressional Budget Office
• The costs shown for options after the first one are incremental increases above the previous 
option. Costs were estimated for the 1996-2010 period.
•  The figures in parenthesis are based on the alternate assumption that the US will incur half 
o f the costs allocated by the CBO study to new members.
4.1.2 RAND analysts estimates
In autiinm 1997, the RAND analysts Asmus, Kugler and Larrabee published 
their study entitled “what will NATO enlargement cost?” The costs are based on their 
analytical jframework presented in chapter II o f this thesis. It is assumed that the first 
tranche o f enlargement will include the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and 
Slovakia. They indicate that the cost o f NATO enlargement will be cheap because 
“enlargement is currently not threat-driven; rather it is part o f an overall strategy o f 
projecting stability to the region and unifying Europe.” Accordingly, changes in the 
postures o f both current and new members will be required which does not need a 
major mihtary build-up. They argue that “an enlarged NATO can meet its requirements 
by upgrading East-Central European defenses and preparing current NATO forces for 
projecting power to the region in case o f a crisis.”^
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F ieure 2; Wide range o f alternatives from the least to the most ambitious^
Paths to 
enlargement
Evolutionary Promote stability Strategic response
Defense
concepts
Self-defense
dominance
Functional division 
o f labor
Core-group
defense
Full-scale
multinational
defense
Military
strategy
Power projection Mixed Forward
presence
Posture Self-defense support Air-power
projection
Joint-power
projection
Forward
presence
Cost $10-20 bn $20-30 bn $30-52 bn $55-110 bn
The authors have outlined four key tasks which “will determine what measures 
are needed to prepare NATO’s defenses for Article V missions in East-Central 
Europe.”* These will be presented here respectively in a summarized form.
Preparing East-Central European forces for NATO membership
•  Making improvements in defense planing that does not result due 
to joining NATO
•  Buying new weapons to replace obsolescent models and adjusting 
force structures to reflect new doctrine; these are the 
responsibility o f new members costing $30-40 billion for 
expensive high technology systems less for rebuilt models
•  Making improvements that are unique to joining NATO: to foster 
compatibility, inter-operability, integration and operational 
effectiveness
Upgrading infrastructure for new members and NATO forces
•  Upgrades o f infrastructure o f new and current members
•  Upgrading will enable joined combined operations
Basing NATO forces in East-Central Europe
•  There is no a priori need for permanently forward deployment on 
the territory o f new members but they have to be prepared for 
such a possibility
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Preparing NATO forces for projection and regional reinforcement
• In order to project stability to East-Central Europe projection and 
regional reinforcement are a primary requirement
• Currently, a few NATO forces are configured for reinforcement 
missions eastwards; a sufficient number of forces will have to be 
configured for adequate reinforcement
4.1.2.1 Possible postures for new members according to their needs
Based on the four essential tasks presented above the authors have defined four 
broad defense postures for NATO to choose fi*om’ (see figure 2). These four defense 
postures are presented below.
1. Self-defense-support
•  Assumes new members will provide their own adequate combat 
forces to meet their security needs
•  NATO’s role will be limited by providing assistance in command, 
control, communications and intelligence (C3I) and logistics
•  Aim is to make new member forces compatible with NATO’s 
integrated structure, upgrade them to NATO standards and 
configure them for defense strategies aimed at defending their 
own borders
•  Under this option NATO does not provide combat forces to carry 
out new Article V commitments
2. Air-power-proiection
•  Builds upon the self-defense support option
•  NATO provides air combat forces for operations in East-Central 
Europe from bases in Western Europe
•  In event o f a crisis, NATO would deploy them forward
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•  Five fighter wing package cost about $25 billion ($20 billion for 
self-defense support foundation and $5 billion for five NATO air 
wings)
•  Ten fighter wing package cost about $30 billion ($20 billion for 
self-defense support foundation and $10 billion for ten NATO air 
wings)
•  Under this option NATO provides air combat forces to augment 
new members ground forces
3. Joint-power-proiection
•  Builds upon the two previous options
• Both air and ground combat forces remain stationed in Western 
European bases to be deployed forward in a crisis
•  These forces would be in a position o f carrying out missions 
ranging from border defense to peacekeeping and crisis 
management
•  Expensive package: ten fighter wings cost $52 billion ($20 billion 
for self-defense support foundation, $10 billion for ten NATO air 
wings and $22 billion for reconfiguring ten NATO ground 
divisions)
•  Medium package: ten fighter wings cost $42 billion ($20 billion 
for self-defense support foundation, $10 billion for ten NATO air 
wings and $12 billion for reconfiguring five NATO groimd 
divisions)
•  Small package: five fighter wings and five ground divisions cost 
$38 billion ($20 billion for self-defense support foundation, $5 
billion for five NATO air wings and $13 billion for reconfiguring 
five NATO ground divisions)
•  Under this option NATO provides both air and groimd combat 
forces to augment new members ground forces
4. Forward-presence
•  Assumes worst-case scenario where new members are facing a 
large-scale threat and short-warning military attack
•  Forward deployment is necessary to counter a short-warning 
military attack
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• NATO deploys ten divisions of both ground and air fighter wings 
forward which cost $110 billion
• Alternatively, deploys three ground divisions and five fighter 
wings forward which cost $70 billion
• This posture is not needed today due to the changed strategic 
environment
4.1.2.2 Alternative paths for enlargement together with their postures
The evolutionary path assum es that there are no immediate security dangers in 
East-Central Europe. The self-defense support option is sufficient to  deal w ith  local 
conflicts. The prom ote stability path assumes that there are instabilities and strategic 
vacuums. Therefore, the power-projection option is needed to deal w ith regional 
dangers. Finally, the strategic response path assum es that there is a direct military 
threat emanating from Russia. Thus, require a forward-presence option to counter a 
theater threat.*
4.1.2.3 The reasonable $42 billion joint-power-projection posture
The authors propose N A T O  to choose the $42 billion joint-pow er-projection  
posture for enlargement w hich include ten fighter w ings and five N A T O  ground 
divisions. Their reasoning is that the joint-power-projection posture will enable the 
Alliance to carry out both its Article V  and non-Article V  m issions. The authors 
indicate that ‘The N A T O  enlargement study implies support for a joint-pow er-
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projection posture while leaving open the issue o f exact force levels.” Furthermore, 
they argue that “such a posture would guarantee that NATO could deter regional 
instabilities and cover a wide spectrum o f regional contingencies.”’ The suggested 
package would cost the enlarged Alliance a total $42 billion ($3-4 billion per year over 
the next decade).*® See Table 6 for the break down o f costs incurred.
Table 6; Breakdown o f costs o f the suggested $42 bUlion package**
Current NATO NATO infrastructure New
members fimds members
Cost $25.6 bn $8.4 bn $8 bn
Cost in % 61 20 19
4.1.3 US Department of State’s study
On 24 February 1997, the Bureau o f Eiuropean and Canadian Affairs o f the US 
Department o f State released the “Report to the Congress on the Enlargement o f the 
N orth Atlantic Treaty Organization: Rationale, Costs and implications”. Among other 
topics related to NATO enlargement, the report tries to give ideas on the financial 
costs and military implications with which the following section is concerned.
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4.1.3.1 Financial Costs
Enlargement o f NATO will incur certain costs for NATO members and the 
countries which will join it. In their article on “what will NATO Enlargement cost?” 
Asmus, Kugler and Larrabee rightfully assert that “ alliances save money”. They state 
that a country providing for its own national defense will spent more resources than a 
country participating in a coUective defense organization. This premise rests on the 
argument that the new democracies in Eastern Europe would require “to assume an 
enormous defense burden, something their small and still-fragile economies can ill 
afford”. Therefore, being a NATO member would allow these countries “to keep their 
defense expenditures modest and to focus their resources on economic 
reconstructioa” However, they underline the feet that the countries who will achieve 
NATO membership will not be in a position to decide for themselves how to spend 
their resources.*^
According to the estimates o f the US Department o f State, the first batch o f 
new members will cost the US, current members and the new members (over a period 
o f 13 years) to a total between $27 to $35 billion. In other words, on average about 
$2.1 to $2.7 billion per year. It is stated that “these figures combine costs that are truly 
incremental” .^  ^ The estimated figures o f the US Department o f Defense rested on the 
following assumptions:
•  A small group o f  non-specified Central European countries would 
join NATO in the first tranche o f enlargement.
•  NATO’s existing strategic concept would serve as the foundation 
for meeting the defense requirements that result from 
enlargement.
•  In the existing strategic environment, there would be no need to 
station or permanently forward-deploy substantial NATO forces
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on the territories o f new members. There would be regular 
training and other cooperation between the forces o f current and 
new members on their territory.
Costs for a mature collective defense capability are incurred over 
13 years, from 1997 through 2009.
Standard NATO cost-sharing rules would be applied for new 
defense arrangements -  i.e., individual NATO nations pay for the 
maintenance and modernization o f their own national forces 
\\diile costs for infrastructure are shared where they qualify for 
common funding.
Some portion o f the estimated costs (including the direct 
enlargement costs) have already been or are currently being 
incurred. For example, military officers from potential new 
members are already receiving English language training, and 
programs are underway in several potential new member 
countries to acquire NATO-interoperability air traffic control 
capabilities.*^
4.1.3.2 Force structures and their costs
The total estimated cost for enlargement o f about $27 to $35 billion were 
divided among the following three categories respectively (see Table 7):
Table 7; Force structures and their costs
P er year in billion US $ 1997-2009 in billion
u s $
Military restructuring costs 0.8-1 10-13
Regional reinforcement 
costs
0.6-0.8 8-10
Direct enlargement costs 0.7-0.9 9-12
T otal costs 2.1-2.7 27-35
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These are defined as costs for military restructuring sufiScient to achieve a
mature capability. It is estimated to cost about $800 million to $1 billion per year and
totaling to an amount o f $10-13 billion fi’om 1997-2009. According to the study, the
term matme capability is defined as follows:
This more ambitious build-up in capability will be vmdertaken largely 
in the period between accession and 2009. New members will 
continue to improve interoperability and undertake other enlargement 
enhancements during this phase, using a combination o f national and 
common NATO funding. During this phase, new members will 
replace aging equipment stocks, and it is expected that they will 
continue to downsize, restructure and modernize their forces, while 
increasing their capacity to operate with other NATO forces in their 
own countries and elsewhere. During the same period, current 
member states will continue to modernize their forces and make them 
more deployable and sustainable both for collective defense and non- 
Article V operations. The creation o f this mature capability will 
produce significant benefits for current and new members, including 
the United States, even in the absence o f any increase in the external 
threat. When completed, the improvements will ensure that new allies 
are fully integrated and can contribute to the full range o f Alliance 
missions. The improved reinforcement capabilities o f European 
NATO allies will result in improved burden sharing arrangements for 
the United States for this as well as other missions. By enhancing 
NATO’s overall collective defense capability, development o f the 
mature capability will allow new manbers to further downsize and 
modernize their forces. Finally, it will create a more solid foundation 
for further enlargement in the future.’*
The Department o f Defense estimated these costs based on the following upgrades in:
•  Ground force modernization for a period o f the projected force, 
including standardized artillery, armor upgrades, refurbished
4.1.3.2.1. New member costs for military restructuring:
61
anununition storage facilities and stocks and deployable support 
enhancements.
•  Air force modernization, including new procurement o f one 
squadron o f refurbished Western combat aircraft per new 
member and modernized ammimition facilities and stocks.
•  Smface-to-air missile procurement, commensurate with the 
strategic environment o f each country.
•  Individual and unit training.“
4.1.3.2.2 NATO regional reinforcement capabilities:
Since an external threat is unlikely, costs would be incurred only in reinforcing 
the new members in areas as deployability, logistics and sustainment. The 
reinforcement capabilities are estimated to cost about $600-800 million and totaling to 
an amount o f $8-10 billion from 1997-2009. For illustrative purpose, the costs were 
calculated on the basis o f four ground divisions and six NATO fighter wings. 
However, it is stated that such a reinforcement capability is not expected.*’
4.1.3.2.3 Direct enlargement costs:
These are costs directly and exclusively linked to enlargement that is divided 
into two phases. It is estimated to cost about $700-900 million per year and totaling to 
an amount o f $9-12 billion from 1997-2009. The first phase consists o f costs related to 
initial capability until the year 2001. Initial capability is defined as follows:
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The first high-priority benchmark that the Alliance must achieve is 
an ‘initial capability’ to conduct Article V missions with respect to 
new members. This level will require improved interoperability and 
some enhanced capabilities on the part o f new member states and is 
expected to be achieved about two years after the current planned 
accession date o f 1999. Department o f Defense assesses that the 
Article V threat to these countries is sufficiently remote during the 
first two years immediately following accession that the risks 
remaining until attainment o f these limited capabilities are 
acceptable. Efforts during this period will focus on relatively low- 
cost, high-payoff enhancements in interoperability to rapidly improve 
the ability o f the forces o f new members to contribute effectively to 
their own defense. The costs for this early phase will be partly paid 
out o f NATO common budgets, with the balance being funded by the 
new members themselves.**
In order to achieve initial capability the report outlined the following upgrades:
Enhancement in command/C3I and reinforcement reception facilities, 
air command and control and logistics. The command/C3I upgrades 
are for refurbishment/renovation o f new members’ existing 
headquarters facilities to accommodate a NATO command and 
control element, including the necessary intelligence and 
communications equipment. These upgrades also include education in 
NATO languages and procedures for officers in higher headquarters. 
Reinforcement reception improvements include air command and 
control (C2), logistics and other improvements. Air C2 enhancements 
are for new members’ acquisition o f interoperable air traffic control 
capabilities (one Air Sovereignty Operations Center (ASOC), in each 
new member country) as well as interoperable aircraft avionics (e.g.,
IFF transponders). Interoperable logistics enhancements include new 
members’ acquisition o f interoperable fuel facilities and other 
support equipment at reception sites as well as the development o f  
host-nation support planning and procedures for arranging routine 
logistics support.*’
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The second phase consists o f costs for achieving mature capability that would
necessitate upgrades the following categories:
First, additional command/C3I improvements require extension o f the 
communications interfaces to all new member forces and include 
additional language training for new member forces beyond those in 
higher headquarters. Second, in the area o f reinforcement reception, a 
weapons engagement capability would be added to each ASOC for 
effective air defense. Third, upgrades for a mature capability include 
improvements to new members’ airfields, road and rail links, ports 
and staging areas to accommodate NATO reinforcements, and 
enhancement fuel storage and distribution capability. Finally, 
exercise enhancements include upgrades to existing exercise facilities 
in new member countries to ensure compatibility with NATO  
training needs and meet NATO safety standards and transportation 
and operating costs for incremental combined exercises tied specially 
to enlargement.^*
While making these estimates the Department o f Defense assumed that new 
members would pay for their own direct enlargement costs. However, for upgrades 
such as to reception facilities would likely fall under NATO’s common funding. 
Therefore, 35 percent o f direct enlargement upgrades would be funded nationally while 
the remaining 15 percent by the US and the remaining 50 percent the current NATO 
members (see Table 8).
Table 8; Direct enlargement cost over 1997-2009
Per year Billion Percent Covered by
$231-346 m $3-4.5 35 New members
$115-154 m $1.5-2 15 United States
$346-423 m $4.5-5.5 50 15 NATO members
Total $692-923 m $9-12 100
Note: Each o f the 15 NATO members are expected to contribute around 3.3% o f direct 
enlargement costs which comes to the figure o f $150-183 million over 1997-2009.
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The estimated costs presented in the previous section depend on how NATO 
plans to carry out its Article V commitments o f Washington Treaty. The higher 
NATO’s defense goals are, the greater will be the defense upgrades leading to 
increased costs. In the “Report to Congress on NATO enlargement,” it indicated that it 
is possible to “outline in general terms how NATO ejqjects to  deal militarily with new 
members imder foreseeable circumstances”. Accordingly, it stated that NATO’s core 
function o f collective defense would remain after enlargement. In order to meet the 
challenges o f the new security environment in Europe, NATO has reshaped its 
strategic concept and military strategy. In 1991, the New Strategic Concept was 
announced which indicated that NATO’s adaptation process in the post-Cold War era 
continued. The New Strategic concept emphasized “on the development of 
multinational force projection, support from extended lines o f communication and 
relying on deployable and flexible logistics support capabilities for crisis management 
o p e r a t i o n s . T h e  report imderlines the fact that NATO’s New Strategic Concept, 
military strategy and the “Study on NATO Enlargement” will provide for the 
framework the Alliance is expecting to carry out its Article V commitments to new 
members. When NATO’s long-term study on new command structure for both Article 
V and non-Article V missions is complete, then the strategy for post-enlargement will 
become much clearer. The report notes that the post-enlargement for NATO strategy 
reflects only the US views. Thus, strategy for post-enlargement may change according 
to ofBcial NATO policy.
The “Study on NATO Enlargement” notes the requirement for an adequate 
conventional posture. It stresses on the need in principle on the capability o f NATO
4.1.3.3 Military implications
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members to be able host allied forces on their territory. Instead o f a large NATO force
on the territory o f new members, it envisions to increase their military force posture to
operational capacity with NATO forces. The report indicates that currently Europe
does not fece any type o f large-scale conventional threats. Therefore, the defense
posture o f enlarged NATO wdU specialize in providing security, reassurance and
involve new members in NATO missions. The report indicates that new members
could be very useful in contributing to
“ ...existing NATO shortfalls in a number of functional areas, 
including civil affairs support, military police operations, tactical 
ground transportation support, medical support, chemical detection 
capabilities, combat services support, search and logistics support.”“  
Furthermore, the report brings clarity to the question on nuclear weapons in enlarged
NATO as it states the following:
NATO has agreed, and has informed Russia, that while new 
members will be expected to support the concept of deterrence and 
the essential role nuclear weapons play in Alliance strate© ,^ 
enlarging the Alliance will not require a change in NATO’s current 
nuclear posture. For this reason, the Alliance has stated that it has no 
intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the 
territory of new members; nor does it foresee any future need to do
so.
Finally, the military in^lications o f NATO enlarged wiU depend upon the decisions o f 
NATO on what kind o f military upgrades the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland 
will need.^'*
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4.2 Strategic assessment of enlarged NATO
This section will assess the military strategic contributions the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland will make and the burden-sharing associated with enlargement. 
Military statistics and maps will be presented while making the strategic assessment.
Table 9; Borders in km o f the o f three coimtries iavited to loin
Borders Czech Repablk Hungary Poland
NATO countries 1304 km 69% 0 km 0% 1114 km 38%
Non-NATO countries 362 km 19% 1643 km 8 2 % 1774 km 61 %
Neutral Austria 214 km 12 % 366 km 18% 0 km 0%
Total border 1880 km 2009 km 2888 km
Total armed forces 1995 70,000 64,300 248,500
Decrease o f armed 
forces (1989-93)
24.6%
22,900
31.5%
29,700
20.5%
64,300
Note: The decrease o f Czech Republic’s armed forces is between 1993-95 Source: IISS
4.2.1 Assessment of the Czech Republic
The inclusion o f the Czech Republic does not bear much o f a burden to NATO 
militarily and in terms o f costs, due to its geographical location. Strategically, the 
Czech Republic’s Moravian Gate which “is a traditional military corridor between the 
N orth European Plain and the Danube in Central Europe”*® could an important asset 
for NATO. The Czech Republic shares out o f its total 1880-km border only 19% with 
a non-NATO Slovakia and 12% with a neutral Austria (see Table 9 & Figure 4). The 
remaining 69% o f its borders, it shares with two NATO countries (Germany and 
Poland). The assumption is that militarily Poland will have to shoulders most o f 
NATO’s eastern flank burden in Europe. Therefore, it can be anticipated that the 
Czech Republic’s strategic role would be miniinal within the Alliance. The US
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Department o f State’s study indicates that “there would be no need to station or 
permanently forward-deploy substantial NATO forces on the territories o f new 
members” but the study does not rule out any such possibility.^^ In the case o f the 
Czech Republic such a possibility can be ruled out because it has two NATO 
neighbors.
Table lOi Military data for the Czech Republic
Year Defense expenditure Total armed forces Terms of service
1993 $801.2 m 92,900 (40,400) 12 months
1994 $956 m 86,400 (40,400) 12 months
1995 $1.1 bn 70,000 (38,500) 12 months
1996 $1.1 bn (budgeted) Not available Not available
1997 $1.3 bn (budgeted) Not available Not available
Note: The figure in parenthesis presents the number of conscripts. Previous data ol
1989-1991 is not available since the Czech Republic became independent in 1993. 
Source: IISS
The Czech Republic has since 1989 reduced its total number o f armed forces
by 24.6% to 70,000 but increased its budget expenditure over the years possibly for
modernization (see Table 10). According to the study o f US Department o f State, it is
expected that new members continue to downsize their forces to increase their capacity
to operational level with other NATO members. Therefore, it can be anticipated that
the Czech armed forces will continue to be reduced to a level that will be announced
by NATO.^’ The 70,000 armed forces o f the Czech Republic only contribute 1.6% to
NATO’s total armed forces, which is small compared to other NATO members share
(see Table 11). The Czech Republic needs further modernization according to the
statement made by the former Czech deputy defense minister Peter Ñecas. In an
interview made in April 1997, he stated
“that modernizing the army was essential unless troops were simply 
to be used as a castle guard in handsome uniforms for parades. He
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also pointed out the direct costs to ensure interoperability with 
NATO were already being paid so that Czech units could participate 
in exercises with NATO members and in the Stabilization Force 
(SFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina. He estimated that another part o f the 
direct costs -  the contribution to NATO’s budget -  would total 300- 
400 million crowns annually (about $10-12 million).”“
The US Department o f State’s study suggests that it is essential that both the ground 
and air force be modernized. It is implied that the acquisition one squadron o f 
refurbished Western combat aircraft together with modernized fecilities and stocks are 
required. Therefore, it is ejqpected that one Air Sovereignty Operations Center (ASOC) 
and an effective air defense system be established on Czech territory which may be paid 
out o f NATO’s common budget. Further upgrades and improvements will need to 
made in airfields, road and rail links on the existing facilities to ensure compatibility 
with NATO standards. The improved air bases could be used to reinforce Hungarian of 
Polish military forces in case o f a crisis.
Table 11; Number o f armed forces o f NATO enlarged
Countries Total armed forces Share in %
US 1,547,300 34.8
Turkey 507,800 11.4
France 409,000 9.2
Germany 339,900 7.7
Italy 328,700 7.4
Poland 248,500 5.6
UK 239,600 5.4
Spain 206,000 4.6
Greece 171,300 3.9
Czech Republic 70,000 1.6
Hungary 64,300 1.4
Other NATO countries 310,000 7.0
Total 4,442,600
Source: IISS
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Figure 4: M ap o f the first wave o f NATO enlargement
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4.2.2 Assessment of Hungary
The inclusion o f Hungary does bear a huge military and cost burden for NATO 
because Hungary does have a land bridge with any o f the NATO members. The only 
route to Hxmgary would through air. Strategically, Himgary is located “astride main 
land routes between W estern Europe and Balkan Peninsula as well as between Ukraine 
and Mediterranean basin. Hungary shares out o f its total 2009-km border only 18% 
with neutral Austria and the remaining 82% with 6 non-NATO countries (Croatia, 
Romania, Serbia and M ontenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine, see Table 9 & 
Figure 4). Himgary’s strategic position to the Alliance is important for the second 
wave enlargement with the inclusion of Slovenia and Romania. The second wave 
enlargement will then create a land bridge between the three countries. Due to 
Hungary’s geographic location, NATO will have to station or permanently deploy 
substantial forces forward for an effective deterrence capability to work until a land 
bridge with any NATO member has been established. The forward deployment can 
include both air and groimd forces.
Table 12; MUitarv data for Hungary
Year Defense expenditure Total armed forces Terms of service
1989 $767.72 m 94,000 (50,500) 18 months
1990 $1.45 bn 86,500 (45,900) 12 months
1991 $1.24 bn 80,800 (53,900) 12 months
1992 $816.8 m 78,000 (52,000) 12 months
1993 $723.2 m 74,500 (53,400) 12 months
1994 $757 m 70,500 (47,500) 12 months
1995 $612 m 64,300 (41,200) 12 months
1996 $520 m (budgeted) Not available Not available
1997 Not available Not available Not available
Note: The figure in parenthesis presents the number o f conscripts. Source: IISS
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Hungary has been reducing its defense expenditure since 1990 and at the same
time has reduced its total armed forces by 31.5% to 64,300 (see Table 9 & Table 12).
However, Hungary will need to increase its defense ejqjenditure over the years to cope
with the added costs o f enlargement. The study by the Department o f State hints at the
procurement o f one squadron o f refurbished Western combat aircrafts. The 64,300
Hungarian armed forces contribute 1.4% to NATO’s total armed forces, which is a
small percent conqiared to other NATO countries (see Table 11). Further reductions in
military forces can be expected. According to the statement made, by the chairman o f
the Hungarian parliament’s Defense Committee, Imre Mecs in M arch 1997, Hungary’s
“defense expenditure might increase by 15-20% but that most o f the 
increase would be needed to modernize a military that had not been 
upgraded in 15-years. Joining NATO would not pose an economic 
burden o f Hungarian people, he argued.”’®
NATO has already an established base in Hungary, which is currently being 
used as “the main logistical center for troops and supplies funneling into the US-run 
northern zone o f the peacekeeping operation in Bosnia.” The base at Tazar is a former 
Soviet airfield in southeastern Hungary. Since December 1995, nearly $20 million has 
been spent to rebuild the base that was leased to the US by the Hungarian Parliament.’* 
Apart fi’om the base at Tazar, NATO will probably establish one ASOC and it will be 
necessary to station surface-to-air missile systems for effective defense capability due 
to Hungary’s strategic environment. The study o f the Department o f State indicates 
that upgrades and improvements in new members military capability “will create a 
more solid foundation for further enlargement in the future.”^^
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4.2.3 Assessment of Poland
The inclusion o f Poland bears an enormous military and financial burden upon 
NATO among the other two countries due to its geographical location. Militarily, 
NATO has to station multinational divisions to reinforce Himgarian armed forces due 
to the “flat terrain and the lack o f natural barriers on the North European Plain.”^^  
Poland shares out o f its total 2888-km border 38% with 2 NATO coimtries (Germany 
and Czech Republic) and the remaining 61% >vith 5 non-NATO countries (Russia’s 
Kaliningrad Oblast, Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine and Slovakia, see Figure 4 & Table 9). 
It can be assumed that Poland is to defend NATO’s eastern flank in Europe for the 
future. It can be expected that NATO enlargement eastward will stop at Poland’s 
eastern borders together with the possible inclusion o f the three Baltic states. This 
assumption makes Poland an important strategic partner for NATO, which will bring 
both financial and military burden to the Alliance. The establishment o f several air 
bases and the stationing o f large multinational divisions would be required for 
deterrence.
Table 13; Military data for Poland
Year Defense expenditure Total armed forces Terms of service
1989 $3.23 bn 312,800 (204,000) 18 months
1990 $2.54 bn 305,000(191,100) 18 months
1991 $2.61 bn (budgeted) 296,500(167,400) 18 months
1992 $1.9 bn 287,500(162,400) 18 months
1993 $2.2 bn 283,600 (160,000) 18 months
1994 $2.3 bn 278,600(158,000) 18 months
1995 $2.6 bn 248,500 (147,100) 18 months
1996 $3.1 bn (budgeted) Not available Not available
1997 $3.4 bn (budgeted) Not available Not available
Note: The figure in parenthesis presents the number o f conscripts. Source: IISS
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Poland has since 1989 reduced its total number o f armed forces by 20.5% to 
248,500 and increased its defense expenditure over the years (see Table 9 &, Table 13). 
The 248,500 armed forces o f Poland contributes 5.6% to NATO’s total armed forces 
which ranks it to be the biggest sbcth contributing nations in NATO (see Table 11). 
According to the estimates o f a Polish study group consisting o f officials from the 
Defense and Foreign Affairs Ministries
“the essential costs o f joining NATO -  integrating the command 
system with NATO, ensuring the compatibility o f the 
telecommunications and air defense systems, and modernizing 
airfields -  would need some $1.5 billion. The group assumed that 
Poland would need to contribute $35-40 million annually to the 
Alliance’s joint budget. According to those estimates, the Polish 
defense budget would increase by no more than 4%. Janusz 
Onyskiewicz, former defense minister and currently chairman o f the 
parliamentary Defense Committee, noted that the cost o f NATO  
enlargement presents no major difficulty to either new or current 
members.”^^
do
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4.3 Conclusion: assessing NATO enlargement in a general 
context
The invitations issued to the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland at the 
Madrid summit is a major turning point in the Alliance history. Some countries who 
had been outside the community o f like-minded democracies over decades will be 
oflBcially part o f NATO by 1999. Certainly, the road to Madrid for both the Allies and 
the countries aspiring for membership have not been easy. While NATO had to find 
reasonable and convincing answers to the questions o f why, whether, who and when; 
the aspiring candidates had to implement the difficult policies o f market economy and 
reform their democracies.
Before making a general assessment of NATO enlargement it is important to 
underline the real reason behind enlargement. Why and against who is the Alliance 
enlarging eastward? The answer to this question lies in the question itself which no one 
wants to dare admit. Generally, the argument put forward by many scholars, analysts, 
US and NATO officials that enlargement is to enhance European security and foster a 
continuous stability is valid and acceptable. Most arguments for and against 
enlargement have been presented in chapter HI o f this thesis in detail and it would be 
repetitious to restate them here again. The strong and determined leadership o f the US 
towards enlargement is a sign that the inclusion o f these countries serves as the 
building blocks o f long-term US strategic interests in Europe. It shoiild be recalled that 
United States gave the start for enlargement and that the decision o f who to invite was 
also determined by the US. Although, the group led by France wanted Slovenia and 
Romania to be included in the first wave o f enlargement the US was determined to 
limit the enlargement to only three countries.
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Figure 5; M ap o f the possible second wave o f NATO enlargement
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On several occasions NATO and especially the US put forth the argument that 
enlargement is not aimed against any country but rather aimed at creating a new 
secxirity architecture for Europe. These arguments have been put forward to deceive 
the Russians that they are not the enemy NATO is enlarging against. Surely, NATO 
enlargement is taking place against a possible future Russian aggression which none o f 
the W estern leaders including the US wants to confess. Russia has been the traditional 
enemy o f the US and this will remain an unchanged m atter o f feet for the future. 
Certainly, Russia is aware that NATO enlargement is aimed against it. This awareness 
has been present since the enlargement issue o f NATO became subject o f public debate 
all over the world. Since the beginning o f the debate, Russia has been trying to de fecto 
veto NATO enlargement but has feiled. Presently, Russia is fer away from its old 
power that it wielded during the Cold War years. Today, it can only say ‘Nyet’ to 
enlargement without having the necessary power to enforce it. On the other hand, 
Washington is fully aware o f Russia’s inability to stand up against enlargement and has 
taken the & st step towards encircling Moscow systematically. Therefore, enlargement 
o f NATO should be evaluated as containing and reducing the Russian sphere o f 
influence in Europe to  the minimum level possible. The reason behind Hungary’s 
invitation should be seen as trying to assuring Russia that enlargement is not aimed 
against it. To convince Russia, it could be argued that Hungary does not have a land 
bridge with any NATO coimtry, if NATO enlargement was aimed against it then the 
inclusion o f either Slovenia or Slovakia should have been necessary.
Hungary’s membership provides the base for the second wave enlargement that 
will take place. It is publicly known that the candidates for the second wave 
enlargement will be Slovenia and Romania (see Figure 5). Thus, the second wave 
constructs a land bridge between four NATO countries (Italy, Slovenia, Hungary and
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Romania) and at the same time draws a new front line up the Black Sea. The 
membership o f Romanian would make it the second NATO country in the Black Sea 
together with Turkey by connecting the two countries via a sea bridge. The final wave 
enlargement could include Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Macedonia 
and Albania which would remove any future Russian influence out o f Europe 
completely (see Figure 6).
The strategic assessment o f NATO enlarged (including Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland) should be evaluated as the bases o f long-term US policy. In the 
broad context, the inclusion o f the three coimtries extends the traditional NATO 
territory in Europe (see Figure 3 and Figure 4) fiorther to the East. At the same time, 
this move increases the early warning time to European capitals, in case o f a military 
attack to the Alliance. This is a net gain for the Alliance because NATO does not fight 
a major conventional or nuclear war to include the three countries into the Alliance. In 
reality, enlargement is the beginning o f a move o f creating new dividing lines in 
Europe. It is publicly known that NATO remains open for further membership. By the 
time the Alliance decides when its enlargement further to the East will end, then the 
final dividing lines in Europe would be drawiL NATO’s final borders could be as near 
as Russia’s current northwestern border (excluding Russia’s Kaliningrad Oblast, see 
Figure 6). The inclusion o f the three countries ends and limits Russia’s sphere o f 
influence to the coimtries outside the enlarged NATO territory. Thus, their inclusion 
brings relief and security to the three countries for which they had demanded for over 
the years.
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Figure 6: Map o f the other applicants for NATO membership
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In the global context, the balance o f power in relation to the number o f armed 
forces increases by 9.5% in fevor o f NATO through enlargement. Previously, Russia 
was facing a total number o f4,059,800 NATO armed forces against 1,520,000 Russian 
armed forces. With an enlarged NATO, Russia will face a larger amoimt o f armed 
forces (see Table 14).
Table 14; How the balance o f power would change
Current NATO
Czech Republic
Hungary
Poland
Enlarged NATO
Russia
Number of armed forces 
1995
4,059,800
70,000
64,300
248,500
4,442,600
1,520,000
Source: ESS
Enlargement relieves the German burden o f defending NATO territory and 
guarantees that a major war in future would not be fought on German soil. The reason 
behind the strong German backing for enlargement is to remove any such possibility 
out o f German borders. It is likely that Poland with its 248,500 armed forces together 
with NATO forces will for the future patrol NATO’s new eastern borders (Poland’s 
eastern borders). This task places Poland on top o f the list o f important strategic 
partners for NATO in Europe. In order for Poland to assume this role, the 
establishment o f strategicaUy located bases are needed which will have to paid out o f 
NATO’s common budget funding. The establishment o f new bases in Poland may be 
expensive for the Alliance but the three countries are joining without costing NATO a 
military war where added cost should not be o f significant importance.
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APPEIVDIX I
The Cracow Declaration
October 1991, Cracow
The principal task set by Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary is a full-range 
integration into the European political, economic and juridical as well as security system. In 
pursuit of accomplishment of this aim our states aspire most of all to an association with the 
European Community, extension of relations with the Atlantic Treaty, including their 
institutionalization, also by means of an international agreement in accordance with the 
American-German proposal of October the 2“*, 1991 and the Western European Union, as well 
as strengthening of the CSCE process and its institutions.
The participants of the meeting regard the comprehensive development of relations 
with the European Communities as the priority objective of their foreign policies. The three 
Central-European countries express their hope to accomplish their negotiations on association 
with the European Communities as soon as possible.
Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary attach fimdamental importance to safeguarding a 
lasting security on the continent especially in the region of Central and Eastern Europe. The 
Triangle states regard Europe as a single and indivisible territory where the security of each of 
the countries is indissolubly connected with the security of others and each of them will have 
equal conditions for preserving its own security.
Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary express their deep concern about the Yugoslav 
crisis. Our three countries reaffirm the necessity of resolving disputes in Yugoslavia 
exclusively by peaceful means.
The Triangle states demand implication of an effectively supervised cease-fire.
The Triangle states propose extension of transregional ties network paying special 
attention to these parts of the continent which have been excluded so far from the process of 
European integration. They regard as indispensable a creation of ties connecting the Central 
Eimope to the Baltic region as well as to the other states and republics eastwards of their 
borders.
Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary decided to develop further and to perfect the 
existing political and economic co-operation as well as to coordinate their efforts aimed at 
building an all-European security system. They will also consistently co-operate in overcoming 
the division on our continent and in elaborating of new forms of the European integration.
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